Why Choose LTAs? An Empirical Study of Ohio Manufacturer’s Contractual Choices Through a Bargaining Lens by Kostritsky, Juliet P. & Ice, Jessica
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2020 
Why Choose LTAs? An Empirical Study of Ohio Manufacturer’s 
Contractual Choices Through a Bargaining Lens 
Juliet P. Kostritsky 
Case Western University School of Law, juliet.kostritsky@case.edu 
Jessica Ice 
jessica.f.ice@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Repository Citation 
Kostritsky, Juliet P. and Ice, Jessica, "Why Choose LTAs? An Empirical Study of Ohio Manufacturer’s 
Contractual Choices Through a Bargaining Lens" (2020). Faculty Publications. 2057. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/2057 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 





WHY CHOOSE LTAS? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF OHIO MANUFACTURER’S 
CONTRACTUAL CHOICES THROUGH A BARGAINING LENS 
 
Juliet P. Kostritsky* and Jessica Ice** 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to recent scholarship regarding Long Term Agreements (“LTAs”) by 
providing empirical evidence that suppliers are more likely to undertake the costs of an LTA if the 
transaction requires significant capital expenditures or the potential for large sunk costs.  Through a 
survey of a random group of sixty-three Ohio supplier/manufacturers, the paper explores why 
supplier/manufacturers with a full range of contractual and non-contractual solutions might 
choose one set of arrangements over others.1  It then seeks to link its findings to a broader theory of 
how parties bargain to solve durable problems under conditions of uncertainty, sunk costs, and 
opportunism, while minimizing costs.  Although only a small portion (seventeen percent) of our 
sample size indicated that they used LTAs in the majority of their transactions, this group indicated 
 
* Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdly Professor of Contract Law and Center for Business Law, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. She would like to thank William Whitford and 
Stewart Macaulay and Lisa Bernstein encouraging this project of empirical research. Thanks are 
also due to Professors Ronald J. Coffey, Peter Gerhart, Brian Gran, Susan Helper, David Porter and 
the interviewees.  Alexa Shook, Jillian Fox, and Stephen J. Kovacic provided  excellent research 
assistance. Timerra Jung provided the administrative help needed for the survey of Ohio 
manufacturers. Oliver E. Williamson’s work remains central to this work.  
 
** J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law; M.A., University of Zurich; B.A., Jacobs 
University Bremen.  
1 Based on the comments provided by respondents, most survey participants seemed to be suppliers 
to buyers/assemblers. 
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they were more likely to produce customizable goods and have significant capital expenditures.  
Such a finding is consistent with a model of bargaining in which parties in a transaction seek to 
achieve their overall goals of wealth maximization while minimizing costs under conditions that 
include bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism.  If a product is customized for a particular 
buyer, and the supplier invests sunk costs toward customization, that investment makes it difficult 
and  costly to exit the relationship or resale to others.  Where such vulnerabilities exist, the need 
for protection may justify the costs of LTAs.  The non-adoption of  LTAs by some suppliers 
demonstrates that the new organizational form of networked firms, governed by an LTA and 
straddling markets and hierarchies, has not captured all of manufacturing and reflects a diversity 
of arrangements. 2   The non-adoption of LTAs may be one way suppliers respond to the stresses and 
frictions of the new architecture of supplier relations.  Those stresses show that the new 
organizational paradigm is not static and suffers from the same hazards as an exchange relation.  
The willingness of suppliers to adopt an LTA when facing large sunk costs shows the continuing 
importance of sunk costs in institutional decision making and offers an additional reason beyond 
the need to collaborate under conditions of uncertainty to explain why parties adopt LTAs. 3  The other 
type of risks of opportunism and vulnerability from investing large resources may be best handled 
 
2 See Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE 
COMMUNITY:  RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 107 (Charles Heckscher & 
Paul S. Adler eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sabel, Real-Time Revolution] (discussing an “organizational 
revolution” distinct from the Chandlerian revolution of vertically integrated bureaucratic firms). 
The new ways of organizing follow from new ways of producing goods.  JOSH WHITFORD, THE 
NEW OLD ECONOMY:  NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING 15–17 (2005) (discussing the “new production paradigm”).  
There are other ways that supplier firms might respond to the stresses in the supply chain other 
than by opting out of an LTA.  They might decide to refuse to engage in joint design with an 
OEM and instead furnish that OEM only with older technology that is already patented.  That 
protects the supplier against the OEM licensing a supplier’s intellectual property to others.  The 
strategy might be described as “patent the heck out of it” before working with an OEM.  See also 
Interview (Aug. 8, 2018) (on file with author).[confidential interview with a company GC] 
3 Sunk costs may also play a role in the willingness of large buyers such as OEMs to adopt LTAs. 
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by entering an LTA because it offers security, including implicit protections needed for the 
supplier to invest.4  The switching costs that lock parties into a mutual dependency and protect parties 
who have invested comes gradually but without the LTA, the supplier would be reluctant to 
undertake the initial investment. 
The importance of sunk costs may also explain the choices of buyers to operate under an 
LTA.  Since many of the benefits of LTAs, including information sharing, could be achieved by 
buyers hierarchically and imposed on suppliers, the explanation for adopting LTAs may lie not only 
with the need to collaborate under conditions of uncertainty and the benefits in terms of added 
value derived from “managerial contracting” practices,5 but with the need to protect large 
investments through the security offered by an LTA.  Thus, there are two functions of LTAs: 
(1) how- to provisions to guide and improve production; and (2) provisions offering security of a 
continuing commitment either through express provisions or implicit protections.  This article 
suggests that although information sharing protocols serve to ‘institutionalize learning’,6 help 
parties when there is an “inability” to know how to solve a production problem and offer more 
information to informally enforce new types of behavior that are non-compliant, these benefits 
might occur by means other than an LTA. For example,  a  quality manual may  impose a quality 
assessment be done by the buyer at the supplier’s plant.  Alternate means of obtaining the 





5 Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting:  A Preliminary Study 1 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
6 Matthew Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract Design, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83, 
83, 88 (2008). [hereinafter Jennejohn, Collaboration]. See also Susan Helper et al., Pragmatic 
Collaborations:  Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANGE 443, 468 (2000) (observing that collaborative firms inherently develop routines for 
evaluating and improving current processes). 








Recent scholarship has identified modern Long Term Agreements (“LTAs”),7 including 
information sharing protocols, as “novel” governance structures for innovative and collaborative 
ventures.8  Such scholarship has hypothesized that LTAs’ information-sharing provisions facilitate 
informal enforcement and help “endogenize” trust in heterogeneous relationships in the innovation 
sphere where none previously existed.9  Other scholarship has focused on how contract provisions 
“institutionalize learning” thereby “fostering innovation”
10 and “establish processes of inter-
organizational collaboration.”11  These functions are broadly useful for buyers. Professor Bernstein 
says that they are “designed to keep the law …out.”12  But the LTA fulfills a variety of functions 
including giving the Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) the option to buy combined with 
some legal protections such as unilateral termination rights, warranty, and IP protections.  How 
buyers structure these hybrid arrangements depends on how the arrangement of provisions and 
informal enforcement facilitated by the information-sharing function operate to achieve the buyers’ 
varied goals, including maximizing profits.  Many of the agreements studied by scholars, such as the 
 
7 These agreements are sometimes referred to as Master Supply Agreements or MSAs. 
8 Jennejohn, Collaboration,  supra note x, at 83.  
9 See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding:  The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in 
Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1404 (2010) [hereinafter Gilson et al., 
Braiding] (“[Parties] write contracts in which they manifestly intend to establish a deeply 
collaborative relation, where little or none existed before, through a combination of formal and 
informal elements.”). 
10 Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note x, at 88–89. 
11 John P. Esser, Institutionalizing Industry:  The Changing Form of Contract, 21 LAW & SOC. INQ. 
593, 625 (1996). 
12 Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in 
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 562 (2015) [hereinafter Beyond Rational 
Contracts].  B u t  many provisions in LTAs deal with warranties and indemnities, provisions that 
are relevant only when there is resort to legal remedies.  Thus, the effort to “keep the law” out 
remains partial. 
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OEM agreement, are drafted by the buyer/assembler.13 
In order to answer the comparative question of why suppliers choose an LTA in only some 
cases, the research team for this Article decided that instead of studying existing LTAs and 
hypothesizing what functions they could serve, it would survey a random group of Ohio 
manufacturers to see what kind of arrangements they used to govern their transactions.  Through 
such a survey, together with qualitative interviews of firms,14 the research team hoped to learn why, 
with a full range of contractual and non-contractual solutions, suppliers might choose one set of 
arrangements over another.  Empirical data gathered in this way might support the idea that parties 
choose their arrangements in a discriminating way to control contractual hazards while minimizing 
costs.15 
This Article first outlines the current view of LTAs within innovation scholarship and 
provides an overview of contractual and organizational choices under the increased de-
 
13 Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing 
Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954, 957 (2006). 
14 Our research did not specifically study other arrangements beyond the choice of using an LTA or 
not using one.  There are other non-contractual choices (corporate ones).  A buyer could decide not 
to buy externally from a separate firm but rather to organize the supplier into a separate subsidiary.  
The buyer might be particularly likely to choose that corporate arrangement if the part needed 
presented a high risk for the buyer if the part malfunctioned.  By cabining the parts supplier into a 
separate subsidiary, the parent could oversee the operation but could also secure a large insurance 
policy to cover any risk if the part malfunctioned.  The parent would be careful not to exercise 
control, but only oversight, in order to avoid veil piercing.  If the company can organize in that 
manner and get an insurance policy to cover the risk, there may be no need for an LTA.Because 
these decisions are made internally and companies weigh the risks without an LTA, against the 
protection offered by an LTA, it might be hard to study the decision-making.  However, the same 
process of cost minimization to control durable problems is at play.  In some instances, the choice 
results in a subsidiary furnishing a part rather than the company securing an external supplier via an 
LTA. 
15See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 114 (1996) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, 
MECHANISMS] (identifying the drive to control contractual hazards, when sunk costs exist, in a cost-
minimizing way as a crucial factor leading to the fundamental transformation of exchange 
relationships, which helps to explain the governance choices parties make, including whether to 
vertically integrate and how to structure buy transactions with external firms). 
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verticalization of firms.  The Article then outlines the current gap in the literature related to 
understanding LTA usage from the supplier’s perspective.  To address this gap, the Article outlines 
its empirical analysis of supplier perspectives through a survey of Ohio manufacturers. Finally, the 
Article links its findings to a broader theory of how parties bargain to solve durable problems under 
conditions of uncertainty, sunk costs, and opportunism, while minimizing costs.16 
Ultimately our research suggests that the choices that parties make about whether to enter 
an LTA or not are driven by the same kinds of factors that affect whether parties use modularity, 
“learning by monitoring” or hedging.  The contractual choice of many choices that will affect the 
economics of the exchange and the same lens should be used to analyze all of these choices. How 
to achieve the parties’ goals at the least cost, while minimizing contractual hazards, including 
opportunism,17 will drive all of these choices.  Goals such as routinizing production and 
preventing mistakes can be achieved through “managerial contracting” provisions such as 
scorecards.  However, those provisions could be imposed unilaterally through quality control 
manuals imposed by buyers on all suppliers or by an LTA. 
 
I. LTAs Within the Innovation Scholarship Framework 
 
16 See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost Approach to 
Understanding Framework Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1621 (2019) (discussing durable 
problems explaining variety of supply chain arrangements).  
17 See Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting:  A Preliminary Study 39  
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
 (explaining that the new agreements as reflecting a move away from “documents that focused 
primarily on the prevention of opportunism . . . to documents that devoted considerable attention to 
governing the contractual relationship.”  In contrast, this Article sees the LTAs as serving both to 
streamline production and at the same time to constrain opportunism by cementing relationships, 
offering specific protection in an option to buy at a fixed price, or through implicit protections that 
arise from the LTAs in the form of switching costs); see also Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 9, at 
1383(discussing that the “managerial” provisions serve as a way to control opportunism by 
suppliers.   However, these provisions also have the potential to introduce opportunism by allowing 
buyers to take information from suppliers to get a lower price). 
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Innovation scholars18 explain the LTAs as a rational contractual response to situations 
where it is difficult to reach a completely contingent contract to control production because of 
high uncertainty over the final product and the need to gain specialized knowledge held by 
external firms.19  LTAs differ from the traditional contractual focus and contain many provisions 
that are not geared to establishing a basis for a breach.20  Instead, firms use such “managerial 
provisions” to provide detailed processes for production that can prevent mistakes and increase 
quality.21 
This Article will first examine why many specific provisions exist in LTAs and describe 
the benefits of successful production.  It will later examine whether there are alternative ways of 
organizing production to achieve similar benefits and examine how the need to protect sunk costs 
explains why parties such as suppliers enter into LTAs.  It will also suggest that the drive to 
control opportunism and shirking of various types explains a firms choice to entering into an 
LTA. However, concerns about opportunism also explains a countertrend in the behavior of 
suppliers in their resistance to entering LTAs or to offer less than full cooperation with the LTAs 
by parties subject to opportunism. 
The LTAs provide many benefits to companies dealing with uncertainty as they may 
 
18 Innovation Scholars include: Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note x and Jennejohn, Collaboration, 
supra note x.  
19 See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1382 (discussing confluence of uncertainty and need 
for expertise from external firms); see also Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1631–32.  If the product is 
certain in the innovation context, other uncertainties such as uncertainty about a counterparty’s 
behavior and his or her potential for opportunism remain uncertain throughout all supply chain 
transactions.  What other factors explain why the LTA prevails in some transactions but not others?  
This Article will offer an explanation based on sunk costs. 
20  Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note x, at 562.  
21 See Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting:  A Preliminary Study 3-4  
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (supra footnote 17). 
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contain protocols to share information and develop routines.22  Sharing these routines allows 
buyers and suppliers to “generate novel alignments of interest [with suppliers] that render 
collaboration more feasible and more necessary.”23  The “input of others” becomes critical when 
buyers develop or improve products and enhance production.24  Scholars of the new forms of 
production and organization have detailed how LTAs can facilitate simultaneous engineering and 
benchmarking,25 improve quality in production, “establish a pragmatic learning process between 
collaborators,”26 and “institutionalize learning.”27  These sharing protocols and collaboration can 
generate benefits that extend beyond improving production and can increase joint returns.28  
When weighed against quality control through warranty enforcement, these production protocols 
are thought to be more effective ways “to better quality.”29  Thus, firms use industrial strategies 
to solve a problem:  firms can no longer profitably acquire and maintain the required expertise in-
house and need to collaborate to survive.30  That strategy affects whether firms make or buy 
 
22 These routines developed in collaborative networks between buyers and suppliers help to foster 
an “organizationally rooted trust as reliability.”  This trust develops with the routines and differs 
from the early concept of a different type of trust rooted in a willingness of “the parties to a 
network [to] agree to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others.”  See 
WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 98 (citing Walter Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network 
Forms of Organization (Barry Staw and L.L. Cummings, eds., 1990)). 
23 Id. at 28. 
24 Id.at 28-9. 
25 See Gary Herrigel, Emerging Strategies and Forms of Governance in High Wage Component 
Manufacturing Regions, 11 INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION 45, 52, 66, 71 (2004) (observing the 
increasing difficulty and necessity for firms to benchmark — ADD QUOTE MARKS. “ keep 
abreast of and compare its own capacities to new developments” in the industry — in the new 
production economy.). 
26 Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 8, at 83.  
27 Id. at 88 (noting that such contracts also result in a convergence of the parties’ interests. That 
result underscores a change in the contract away from risk allocation to “align[ing] interests . . . .”). 
28 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 29 (quoting Helper et al., supra note 6, at 445) (“[O]nce the 
cooperative exploration of ambiguity begins, the returns to the partners from further joint 
discoveries are so great that it pays to keep cooperating.”). 
29 Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4, at 7 (citing American Society for Quality Control). 
30 See Helper et al., supra note 6, at 445, 463; see also WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 98. 
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products needed in production. 31   That choice also affects how firms are governed:  internally by 
bureaucratic fiat, by contracts of varying types with external firms, or by some other 
mechanism.32 
Where innovation requires both investment and collaboration, and investments may be 
asymmetric, information sharing in an LTA may foster informal enforcement by increasing 
transparency33 and observability.34  Professor Bernstein explains these LTAs as beneficial because 
they “create a space in which private order can flourish.”35  The iterative exchange of information 
and performance can deter opportunism and raise switching costs.36  As each party learns about 
the other, the costs of finding a substitute supplier or buyer increases for unknown parties.  
“Switching costs” acts as a deterrent to early termination.37 
 
31 See Ann P. Bartel et al., Technological Change and the Make-or-Buy Decision, COLUM. BUS. SCH. 
7 (Mar. 27, 2012) (observing that the fraction of firms that find outsourcing more profitable 
increases with the pace of technological change); see also Robert Gibbons, Firms and Other 
Relationships Lecture Note 4, in THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM:  CHANGING ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 188 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) (evaluating the make 
or buy decision in the context of “whether integration or non-integration facilitates the superior 
relational contract”). 
32 See Section V.c. Diversity of Arrangements.  
33 See Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 8, at 87 (discussing how transparency “largely 
eliminates opportunism.”); see also Helper et al., supra note 6, at 469–72 (explaining that pragmatic 
collaborations advance the collective knowledge of the parties and curb opportunism through the 
sharing of information). 
34 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 12 , at 584 (observing that contracts, to 
maintain cooperation, often give parties rights to conduct a root cause analysis and monitoring 
which “condition on information that in their absence would not be observable . . .” thereby 
allowing for more informal enforcement possibilities). 
35 Id. at 561 (noting however, presumably private order can flourish without LTAs as parties engage 
in iterative investments and develop a relationship). 
36 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 9, at 1383–84 quoting Ronald J.  Gilson et al., Contracting for 
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 468-9 
(2009). For an earlier discussion of switching costs see Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations 
in Business, 28 Amer. Soc. Rev. 55, 64 (1963).  Of course, the iterative exchange of information may 
occur during a relationship between a buyer and supplier without an LTA.  The parties can take 
small steps to accommodate another party and the other party may then respond in kind, in a kind of 
overture and response scenario.  An LTA is not needed to accomplish this.  Id. at 1384. 
37 Id. at 1383 




II. Sourcing and Contractual Choices in the Age of De-verticalization:  An 
Evolving Landscape 
 
In the last several decades, the large integrated firm has de-verticalized.38  The pressure to 
cut costs, while keeping up with specialized expertise that is expensive to develop in-house, led 
large and complex firms to develop various types of arrangements with suppliers to source and 
organize production.39  One scholar has described a “multiplicity” of producer “sourcing 
structures”.40  The diversity of suppliers’ arrangements by producers responds to various 
pressures exerted by large and complex firms as buyers.  Producers are struggling to respond to 
unpredictable and varying behavior by such buyers.41 
A. Collaboration 
One arrangement in this de-virtualized economy that has received a great deal of scholarly 
attention is the pragmatic collaborative arrangement between large buyers and suppliers who 
participate in “learning by monitoring.”42  To enhance quality and prevent costly errors on the 
 
38 See, e.g., WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 18 (describing a “shift” in the production economy 
throughout the twenty-first century); Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding:  Using 
Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 
985 (providing a list of some of the “pervasive uncertaint[ies]” in present-day innovation 
contacts); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation:  Vertical Disintegration and 
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 438 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson et al., 
Contracting for Innovation] (“[F]ear of holdups . . . no longer compels firms to vertically 
integrate.”); Herrigel, supra note 16, at 55 (discussing OEMs concerns in the “current 
environment of consistent vertical disintegration”). 
39 See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 439–40. 
40 Herrigel, supra note 16, at 46. 
41 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99. 
42 See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 435, 448. 
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production line, buyers require suppliers to participate in root cause analysis,43 benchmarking,44 
and other routines to enhance quality. 45  Companies who may be dealing with “radical 
uncertainty” characteristics, such as the biotechnology industry, may share information about a yet 
unknown product or drug.46 
Often the parties enter into LTAs with information-sharing protocols and other provisions 
to encourage collaboration.  Buyer/manufacturers and suppliers develop routines that allow 
manufacturers/assemblers/buyers to learn from suppliers and coordinate in ways that facilitate 
collaboration.47  Collaboration may be necessary for buyers because the cost of research and 
development for specialized expertise is too great, making collaboration a cheaper way of 
acquiring the needed expertise.  The collaboration and sharing of information in networks of 
buyers and suppliers can both benefit “from joint discoveries.”48  This collaboration and 
information sharing between buyers and suppliers constitutes, according to some scholars, a new 
“organizational revolution”49 that stands between vertical integration and spot market transactions. 
Others have described these arrangements as “neither fully transactional nor fully relational.”50 
 
43 John Paul MacDuffie, The Road to Root Cause:  Shop Floor Problem Solving at Three Auto 
Assembly Plants, 43 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 479, 486 (1997). 
44 See Herrigel, supra note 16, at 73–74. Fix the supra. 
45 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 42, 98 (noting one of the key benefits of the routines for 
information sharing and collaboration ideally lead to “jointly question” the production process and 
that questioning both disrupts and leads to improvements); CHARLES F. SABEL, THEORY OF A REAL 
TIME REVOLUTION 107 (2003) [hereinafter SABEL, REVOLUTION] (“[P]ermanent uprising against 
routine . . . [a] key to survival in otherwise unmanageably turbulent world.”) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Columbia Law Review) cited in Whitford, supra note x, at 99 ; see also 
Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 8, at 101; Helper et al., supra note 6, at 472 (stating that 
disruptions can change “static rules” and thus lead to improvement). 
46 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 28. 
47 Helper et al., supra note 6, at 445 (“[The] pragmatic mechanisms . . . create and maintain the 
conditions under which two or more firms can sustain collaboration.”). 
48 Id. 
49 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99, 100. 
50 Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4, at 1. 
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The sharing of information and new networks can occur in a variety of contexts. For 
example, when there is uncertainty, as in the biotechnology industry about what will be invented, 
or in traditional manufacturing industries where the uncertainty is about emerging improvements.  
The sharing takes the form of simultaneous engineering, benchmarking, root cause analysis, and 
routines all designed to improve the quality of the final product through incremental 
improvements.51  The decision to share information, in the innovation or industrial sector in a 
rapidly changing world with intense competition, might suggest that this networked approach with 
information sharing protocols is the “key to survival”52 and that companies will converge on this 
path and become locked into this approach.53 
B. Modularization 
Of course, there are other ways to source production.  Some suppliers become large tier 
mega suppliers who collaborate in the way described above.  Sometimes OEM buyers pursue a 
modularization strategy with large suppliers becoming assemblers of “discrete subsystems or 
functional modules (example in an automobile:  front end, cockpit, drive train, common chassis 
platforms, etc.).”54  Modularity, by reducing the need for coordination and collaboration,55 could 
 
51 See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 449 (“[W]hat we see emerging [is] 
. . . continuous improvement in product development and engineering.”); see also id. at 438 (“[F]ear 
of holdups . . . no longer compels firms to vertically integrate.”). 
52 Sabel, Real-Time Revolution, supra note 2, at 107.  
53 However, collaborative networking and the “forced openness of joint design and learning by 
monitoring” is not necessarily the last stage of organizational development as the collaboration 
itself is subject to failure for a number of reasons including “factional conflicts” in firms that 
undermine the collaborative strategies themselves and by opportunism in the form of misusing 
information.  WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99. 
54 Id. at 61 quoting Gary Herrigel & Wittke Volker, Varieties of Vertical Distintegration: The Global 
Trend Toward Heterogeneous Supply Relations and the Reproduction of Differences in US and 
German Manufacturing, in Richard Whitley, Glenn Morgan and Moen eds. National Business 
Systems in the New Global Context (2004).  
55 Henry Smith, Modularity in Contracts:  Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV.  
1175, 1177 (2006) cited in Matthew Jennejohn, 14 STAN. BUS. L. J.STAN. BUS. L. J 142 (2008). It 
is important/critical to retain the cited in language for letting the reader where I found this idea.  
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reduce costs.  However, modularization, at least in the automobile industry, has proven to be less 
successful as a sourcing strategy than originally anticipated.56  Because automobiles are 
necessarily integrated with one system affecting another, “to a degree that renders their separate 
design almost impossible without sacrificing performance,”57 modularization “along the lines of 
black box contract manufacturing is a difficult proposition.”58 
The adoption and then decline of modularization and the partial adoption and failures in 
networks (particularly the hedging by suppliers in response to opportunistic behavior by OEMs 
and the institutional blockages that hinder buyers from fully collaborating),59 demonstrate that 
organizational choices, are not static ones.  Instead, organizational choices are contextual and 
driven by the economics of the exchange, including all of the transaction costs.  Such 
organizational choices include whether to operate by a network, whether and how much to 
collaborate or withhold information, whether to adopt modularization as a sourcing strategy, or 
whether to resort to a discrete market transaction.  The choices about how much knowledge to 
retain in-house may respond to a need by buyers/assemblers/manufacturers to gauge how well the 
suppliers are performing.60 
The choice to organize production by sharing routines in a collaborative network or to 
choose another way of sourcing production, such as modularization, is context- dependent.  There 
is not one organizational solution to the problems that parties face.  That same diversity of 
 
56 See Francois Fourcade & Christophe Midler, Modularisation in the Auto Industry:  Can 
Manufacturer’s Architectural Strategies Meet Supplier’s Sustainable Profit Trajectories?, 4 INT. J. 
AUTOMOTIVE TECH. & MGMT. 240, 241 You added this citation but our library does not have this 
source. Please send asap.  (2004). 
57 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 62 quoting Herrigel, supra note x, at 54 at 49. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 99. 
60 Id. at 62–63 (noting the importance of knowledge retention to “evaluate the performance of 
suppliers”). 
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arrangements extends not only to the type of supply arrangement for sourcing production but also 
to the choice of whether to formalize those routines in an LTA, as well as to the choice of whether 
to opt-out of an LTA.  These are all rational responses by buyers and suppliers to t h e  particular 
circumstances in product development and sale, to the risks of failure, to the dangers of 
opportunism in settings of low or high asset specificity, and to the tradeoffs that each party is 
making to those risks and returns. 
C. Opportunism and Sunk Costs 
Empirical work by Professor Josh Whitford shows that the success of these federated 
collaborations between buyers and suppliers is only “partial.”61  OEM buyers  remain “deeply 
cautious about genuinely relying on supplier firms,”62 and suppliers react to opportunistic 
behavior by OEM buyers by hedging and withholding information, thereby reducing joint 
returns.63  The choice of whether and how to organize production, whether to vertically integrate, 
operate by discrete market transactions or to form collaborative information networks and how 
fully to cooperate within these networks, is affected by transaction costs and the fear of holdup.  
For example, owners may vertically integrate to solve the holdup problem.64  A major driver of 
vertical integration is profit capture.  A company vertically integrating decides to capture the 
profit that the supply company would otherwise accrue to the supplier’s shareholders.65  Vertical 
integration may also be done to deny competitive access from a supplier to another large OEM.  
 
61 See id. at 100 (disputing Sabel’s description of the new collaborative networks as “an inescapable 
organizational revolution” by noting “it remains altogether partial”). 
62 Id. at 31. 
63 Id. at 100 (discussing suppliers’ strategy of hedging to withhold information and investment in 
response to “OEM unreliability”). 
64 WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMSsupra note 15, at 16; see also Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 8, 
at 84–85. Mechanisms is the book title, not Mechanics. 
65 See generally Anne Sraders, What is Vertical Integration and What are the Benefits?, THE STREET 
(Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/markets/what-is-vertical-integration-and-what-are-the-
benefits-14671684 (detailing the benefits of vertical integration). 
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Or a company may decide to produce, and not buy, because of the cost of transmitting to suppliers 
the knowledge of what is needed (“tacit knowledge”) makes it easier and cheaper to produce the 
goods. 66 
The economics of exchange, profit, minimizing frictions, and transaction costs underlie 
organizational decisions about where the boundaries of the firm should lie.  Those same economic 
considerations drive the coordination mechanisms adopted by OEM buyers to streamline the 
production process and promote innovation and expand the reach of informal non-contractual 
relations resulting in a decreased importance for delineating performance obligations under 
constant adjustment.  The drive to economize on transaction costs will affect other decisions made 
by suppliers who will be subject to the same profit driver from the economic exchange. 
Operating by network and sharing information with a supplier governed by an LTA 
“creates an information symmetricizing machine in which actors must keep each other abreast of 
their intentions and capacities.”67  The sharing of information also helps to curb opportunism as it 
raises switching costs for both parties in the supply chain.  A “virtuous circle”68 may result in 
which parties learn more about each other’s reliability and competence, which reinforces 
collaboration.  These information-sharing protocols are consistent with “Macaulay’s definition of 
contract as ‘devices for conducting exchanges.’”69 
The choices of contractual form, decisions about structure, the inclusion of detailed 
 
66 John Paul MacDuffie & Susan Helper, Creating Lean Suppliers:  Diffusing Lean Production 
Through the Supply Chain, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 118, 120 (1997) (“Extensive tacit knowledge can 
develop in the supplier-customer relationship, facilitating coordination of the respective expertise of 
the parties, particularly with respect to complex value-added tasks such as product development.”). 
67 Helper et al., supra note 6, at 472. 
68 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99. 
69 David Campbell, What do We Mean by Non-Use of Contract, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS 
SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY ON THE EMPPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 166–67(Jean 
Braucher, John Kidwell, & William C. Whitford eds., 2013). 
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protocols, and cooperation during the relationship may also respond to behavioral proclivities to 
opportunism of one’s collaborating partner and changes in the relationship, such as the misuse of 
information by the buyer.70  The context affects how fully one party cooperates and those risks 
may also affect the decision to opt into or out of an LTA.  Breakdowns may also occur due to 
“factional conflicts”71 within an organization of buyers that hinder collaboration and increase 
uncertainty for suppliers.  The withholding of information or hedging by the supplier represents a 
private strategy to minimize the costs of opportunism.72  Instead of opting out of the agreement, 
the least cost response may be hedging. 
The decisions of how to operate and what organizational mode to use, whether it is a 
network or a hierarchy or a market transaction, whether to hedge or not, and what contractual 
form to rely on (LTA or purchase order) for governing production, are all responses to durable 
problems that parties face in exchange relationships.  One of the institutional choices suppliers 
make is what type of contract to agree to — whether to enter an LTA or to opt-out of such an 
agreement. 
The same considerations that affect parties deciding how to structure their organization of 
the supply chain, whether in a collaborative network or a hierarchy or by market, affect the choice 
of whether to enter an LTA.  Parties ask how can they increase joint returns and address durable 
problems while minimizing the frictions that affect exchange relationships.  The empirical 
evidence from our survey demonstrates that the decision to enter an LTA is affected by the 
presence of large capital equipment costs, a sunk cost with asset specificity.73  In all of the 
networks that have been extensively studied in the automotive and innovation contexts, there are 
 
70 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 103. 
71 Id. at 99. 
72 See id. at 100. . P. 100 is the place to cite.  
73 See Kostritsky Ice Survey, infra pp. [X].  
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large sunk costs, uncertainty, and a need to de-verticalize to capitalize on the expertise of 
suppliers.  Where such sunk costs are present, the parties cannot simply exit without being at risk 
for losing sunk costs.74  The parties devise structures and routines that are embodied in a long term 
contract to deal with uncertainty about the product and their partner’s reliability and competence.  
Those routines create a “roadmap”75 or “scaffolding”76 for guiding production, reducing 
uncertainty, and lessening the chances of shirking or substandard goods.  Those routines also 
lessen the risk of opportunism by raising switching costs.  As parties become embedded in these 
relationships, that embeddedness substitutes for trust.  It cements the relationship, protects the 
sunk cost investments, and secures other protections, such as guaranteed fixed prices or an option 
of ordering that protect sunk cost investments. 
 
III. Why Choose LTAs? 
 
The decision by buyers and suppliers  to enter into an LTA when the parties have sunk 
costs — a result revealed by the survey — constitutes one mode of protecting those sunk costs.  
When buyers and suppliers engage in joint projects that require either party to have significant 
capital expenditures, the parties may benefit from provisions in the LTA that encourage 
collaboration and efficiency.   Empirical work looking at collaborative agreements and 
 
74 See Kostritsky, supra note x, at 1675. THIS IS THE AMERICAN U. L. REVIEW ARTICLE. 
SINCE IT IS NOW IN PRINT LET’S CITE TO THAT PUBLISHED ARTICLE. see also OLIVER 
E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING 53  (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS].  
75 Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 4, at 1. 
76 Hadfield, supra note 36, at 988. 
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networks shows that provisions requiring shared information77 or cost reductions78 often arise 
in an LTA.  However, if the sharing protocols deter opportunism and are costly to implement, 
then why would either the buyer or the supplier decide to enter or avoid a formal LTA and in 
what circumstances? 
In answering that question, it may help to think about all the different ways that 
knowledge about the other party’s reliability and the information needed for error detection 
could be obtained and with what agreements.  There is the further question of how collaboration 
affects the arrangements. First, in situations with multiple buyers, the supplier could develop a 
commodity good and operate purchase-order-by- purchase- order while remaining confident that 
it could exit and sell the commodity to others.   Second, in a supply arrangement with limited 
large buyers and multiple suppliers, a buyer and supplier could exchange goods pursuant to a 
purchase order and reply.  Knowledge about the other party’s reliability and competence would 
emerge gradually as the buyer continues to buy and the supplier continues to provide goods.  No 
LTA would be required for that knowledge about reliability and competence to develop into 
trust.  Third, in situations with a large buyer and multiple suppliers, a supplier could invest a 
large amount in capital costs but without collaborating with the buyer. In that case the supplier 
might insist on an LTA to guarantee that the buyer’s purchase obligations would defray the cost 
of the capital equipment. An LTA governs though there is no collaboration.79  Fourth, in highly 
innovative settings with a scarcity of suppliers (i.e. biopharmaceuticals), the parties might 
 
77 See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 9, at 1404–05 (noting that parties contract to “motivat[e] the 
iterative exchange of private information”); Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, 
at 49–50 (referencing the Deere-Stanadyne agreement to show how parties today may enter long-
term contracts for the purpose o f  a s s e s s i n g  p a r t i e s ’  “ c a p a b i l i t i e s . ” ). 
78 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 76 (observing that OEMs and suppliers can collaborate to reduce costs 
over time). 
79 Anonymous Interview (June 16, 2017) (on file with author). 
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engage in a collaborative project and enter into an LTA with sharing protocols. 
Thus, the desire to recoup sunk costs and a firm’s bargaining power, rather than 
innovation and uncertainty, is the distinguishing feature that may influence parties to enter into 
an LTA.80  That conclusion may be warranted because information obtained through an LTA 
could also be obtained by other hierarchical management techniques and the trust could be built 
up incrementally through the exchange of goods.  Any buyer could draft a purchase order 
insisting that a supplier submit to information- sharing protocols.  Trust about competence and 
reliability could build up over time.  However, if the buyer, such as an OEM, is investing in a 
model car and a supplier is investing in a plant that will furnish a door for that model car, the 
buyer and the supplier both need the security of a long-term commitment. 
What does the LTA provide that could not be provided by benchmarking or other 
routines?  For the supplier there may be implicit protections against early termination or even 
explicit protections of a long-term purchase contract, even if qualified by contingencies such as 
meeting the competition’s pricing.  That long-term contract may exist in combination with 
sharing protocols in which parties collaborate toward quality improvements or innovations.  
The buyer wants an LTA to guarantee a price and continuing supply, benefits that could not be 
achieved unilaterally or by “management technique[s].”81  The buyer may be reluctant to invest 
in a production facility without the benefit of an LTA guaranteeing price and supply.  In each 
case parties trade off and determine which institution, contract, provisions, or organization will 
maximize joint benefits by achieving their myriad goals at the least cost. 
Then, having entered a particular structure, the parties continue to make adjustments, 
such as hedging, in response to new pressures, such as opportunistic use of shared information.  
 
80 Id. 
81 Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 8, at 87. 
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The decision about whether to enter a network subject to a formalized LTA is only one of the 
many choices parties must make. Parties and suppliers making tradeoffs in order to lessen the 
risks and costs of unremedied contractual hazards, but also decide on choices about how fully to 
cooperate and whether to resist or hedge by withholding information or failing to invest.82 
Where there are no sunk costs or large capital equipment costs by suppliers, suppliers 
may opt out of LTAs, perhaps deciding that the costs extracted by buyer in the LTAs outweigh 
any benefits of such agreements. In particular, one such reason may be the onerous burdens on 
suppliers to constantly reduce prices in response to buyer demands.83  Suppliers can simply exit 
to the market and find another buyer.  LTAs may be the least costly alternative for organizing 
production in the supply chain, particularly when the suppliers seek to reduce uncertainty about 
the buyer by continuing to deal with the buyer. 
 
IV. The Survey Approach to Analyzing Why Firms Use LTAs 
At least some of the benefits of an LTA could be imposed by buyers unilaterally or in a 
short terms and conditions section of a purchase order.84 Through such short term agreements, 
buyers c a n  develop increased knowledge about reliability and competence of suppliers, and 
benefits such as informal enforcement, monitoring, and an increases in switching costs can occur 
without an LTA. The key question remains:  why parties would enter into an LTA or decide not 
to do so?  What mechanism or institution will achieve the parties’ goals and at what cost?  Some 
industrial strategies, such as the LTAs with learning routines, respond to new pressures on buyers 
to enhance knowledge and improve quality under increased time pressures. When implementing 
 
82 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 100. 
83 Id. at 81, 102. 
84 See supra Part III. 
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strategies in particular contexts, including the types of contractual and non-contractual 
arrangements, parties consider how the institutions selected will respond, not only to knowledge 
enhancement and competitive pressures on quality and price, but also to problems of 
opportunism and other durable problems in the supply chain.  Switching costs, with the resultant 
deterrence of opportunism, could be achieved in other less costly ways without a formal LTA 
a g r e e m e n t . 
Current scholarship focusing on “exemplars,” or significant LTAs in the innovation 
field,85 has identified increased transparency from LTA information-sharing protocols as one 
reason to contract using an LTA.  Ideally, as information is shared in an iterative fashion, 
pursuant to the LTA, parties’ uncertainties about each other are reduced and knowledge is 
enhanced. That knowledge leads to improvement in production and the development of new 
technologies.86  However, often it is the suppliers who are being asked to share information, so 
LTAs may reduce uncertainty only for the buyer. 
This article posits that the LTA is a governance mechanism or a “machinery to work 
things out”87 that may not be necessary or cost-effective when there are no idiosyncratic 
investments.  Thus, the form of contract is tied to the functions the parties seek to achieve, 
including the need to protect investments.  That need could affect both buyers and suppliers in the 
supply chain.88  This article supports Oliver Williamson’s theories of contracting by providing 
empirical evidence that parties may undertake the costs of “specialized governance structures” 
 
85 See generally Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36 (analyzing the reasons 
companies choose to enter specific LTA-exemplar contracts). 
86 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99 (explaining that “the forced openness of joint design and learning 
by monitoring creates the conditions for a ‘virtuous circle,’” or a waltz). 
87 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 72, at 60 (coining the term “machinery to 
work things out”). 
88 See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra p. 86 (noting empirical data was collected only on suppliers). 
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such as LTAs where there is “considerable investment in transaction-specific assets.”89  As 
Williamson explains, the “specialized structures come at great cost, and the question is whether 
the costs can be justified.”90 
This Article offers another justification for the LTA that is separate from the “learning by 
monitoring” pragmatic collaboration that has been explored deeply by other scholars.  While the 
“learning by monitoring”91 devices and routines in the newer forms of LTAs may be effective 
tools to deal with problems with performance based on an “insufficient understanding of the 
problem at hand, or even how to pose it in the first place,”92 they cannot completely eliminate 
opportunism in a supply relationship.  When the problems faced by parties also include an 
“unwillingness” and “self-regarding motives,”93 the LTA offers security to protect parties who 
invest large resources and might lose that investment or be subject to holdup after making a large 
investment.  A buyer might be reluctant to invest in a model car without the security of long- term 
sourcing and price assurances.94  The supplier might be reluctant to invest in building a factory to 
build doors for a customer without some security.95 
Studying existing LTAs and situating them within industrial and production strategies can 
elicit theories about the functions they serve, but such studies do not shed light on why parties 
prefer certain arrangements over others.  By expanding the range to random manufacturers, the 
 
89 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 72, at 60. 
90 Id. 
91 Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 448. 
92 Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring:  The Institutions of Economic Development 23 
(Colum. L Sch. Ctr. Law & Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 102, 1993) [hereinafter 
Sabel, Learning by Monitoring], 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/s23abel/papers/Learning%20by%20Monitoring.pdf. 
93 Id. 
94 Interview  (January 25, 2019 ) (on file with author). (anonymous).  
95 Interview with Susan Helper, Professor of Law, Case Western University Susan Helper (Feb. 21, 
2017) (on file with author); see also Kostritsky Ice Survey infra p. 86 (showing the aggregated 
survey responses). 
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research team hoped to shed light on why and when parties adopt an LTA or opt out.  Since 
parties could provide for submitting to collaboration outside an LTA (for example, through 
provisions of a quality manual96) the question arises when and under what circumstances an LTA 
is a cost minimizing method of achieving the parties’ goals?  The prior focus on LTAs 
themselves, instead of on the use or non-use of such agreements, means that important insights 
about contractual preferences based on factors like industrial variations, sunk costs, or firm size 
might have been overlooked.  For instance, the research team discovered significant differences 
in LTA usage across industries (see graph below).97  Simply analyzing differing terms within 
LTAs across various industries would not have demonstrated industrial variations in usage, 






96 See discussion infra Section IV.C (explaining that quality manuals dictate purchase orders or 
terms and conditions).  
97 See Figure 1 (finding that, based on survey responses, aerospace companies are far more likely to 
use LTAs than other industries). 
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Therefore, instead of focusing on the terms of high profile LTAs like the agreement 
between Apple and SCI,98 or between Eli Lilly & Emisphere Techs Inc.,99 the research team 
designed a survey to shed light on the types of agreements a random group of Ohio manufacturers 
used in their transactions, including the choice to use LTAs or other arrangements.  Using data 
from a random sample of manufacturers allowed for empirical comparisons across industries and  
firm sizes.  In most instances, the terms in agreements between buyers (often OEMs) and 
suppliers are drafted and dictated by the buyers to the suppliers.100  Thus, simply studying terms 
of an LTA may not shed light on supplier thinking. 
Since many of these LTAs are drafted by large OEMs or other buyers, such as aerospace 
companies, and the information often travels almost exclusively from the supplier to the buyer, 
the question arises as to when and why LTAs will be either resisted or embraced by suppliers?  
When and why would an LTA be used and result in overall cost minimization for each party?  
Since the research team did not survey buyers in that capacity, we offer only tentative answers on 
buyers based on an analysis of some LTAs and current literature analyzing such agreements.  Our 
results do shed empirical light on the choices by suppliers that suggest that the choice of 
contractual form is context dependent, tied to sunk costs and not a static choice, but one that 
varies as the pressures on suppliers increase or change.  That decision to adopt or opt out of an 
 
98 Apple Computer, Inc. & SCI Systems, Inc., Foundation Manufacturing Agreement (May 31, 1996)  
[https://contracts.onecle.com/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml [hereinafter Apple-SCI Agreement]; 
see also Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 463 (noting “SCI, was at the 
time [of the agreement with Apple] one of the largest contract manufacturers”).R e v i e w  
a d d e d  t h i s  l a n g u a g e  a n d  i t  i s  a  d i r e c t  q u o t e  s o  n e e d s  
q u o t a t i o n  m a r k s .   
99 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-1504, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23245, at 
*2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2006). 
100 See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra pp. 94–95 (showing the aggregated survey responses to Q8 and 
Q9 which in turn demonstrate the proportion of terms that manufacturers can dictate, and then the 
proportion of manufacturers who reported that the terms are dictated to them). 
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LTA parallels other decisions suppliers make to “hedge” in order to protect themselves against 
buyer misuse of information.101 
In analyzing the myriad of choices of suppliers to enter an LTA, opt out, render less than 
full cooperation under the agreement, or protect against the risks of buyers licensing a supplier’s 
intellectual property by only furnishing older technology that is already patented,102 it helps to 
situate those choices within a bargaining model.  Each party approaches an exchange with its 
own private goals (to solve durable problems such as opportunism) and the parties will reach a 
particular bargain only if the benefits of achieving those goals outweigh the costs.  Similarly, 
firms will constantly look for an arrangement that minimizes their costs while controlling 
contractual hazards, thereby maximizing value.  Once the entire universe of agreements is 
considered, including factors that incline suppliers to use an LTA or to operate under other 
documents, it becomes possible to tie the parties’ choice of form to a model of bargaining under 
conditions that include bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism.103  Under this model, 
one considers how parties in a transaction seek to achieve their overall goals of wealth 
maximization while minimizing costs. 
 
V. Survey Methodology 
 
To evaluate the key question of why suppliers decide to use an LTA, the research team 
developed a survey of thirty-four questions about topics regarding why firms use LTAs, how 
 
101 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 51. Hedging discussed on p. 51 not 52.  
102 See Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1644–47 (discussing the problems parties face regarding 
opportunism and the appropriation of Intellectual Property); see also Interview (August 8, 2018) (on 
file with author). We do not use buyers and sellers here.  
103 See Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1656–57. 
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often firms use LTAs, when firms engage in information-sharing between the buyers and 
suppliers, and the enforceability of LTAs and Master Supply Agreements (“MSA”).104  The 
survey was designed to determine if and when LTAs were used by manufacturers.105 The 
manufacturers in the survey predominantly represented suppliers in buyer and supplier 
arrangements. 
To identify survey participants, our research team obtained a list of 1,875 Ohio-based 
manufacturers from the Mergent Intellect database.  The research team identified manufacturers 
by using the super sector Northern American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) codes 
related to manufacturing.106  Data from Mergent Intellect included each manufacturer’s name, 
phone number, physical address, and industry sub-sector.  A paper-based mail survey was sent to 
the manufacturers obtained on the original list.  After the first paper mailing, our team received 
fifty-eight  responses either by mail or online. 
The research team scrubbed the list to remove any duplicate companies or companies that 
had gone out of business, reducing the total number of “potentially active” manufacturers to 
1,458.  Then, the research team manually searched of all “potentially active” manufacturers online 
to find their email addresses for an online survey.  Of the 1,458 “potentially active” 
 
104 The questions regarding information sharing also touched on collaboration between the 
manufacturers and the buyers.  Recent scholars have tied the information sharing protocols in LTAs 
to the benefits of informal enforcement of parties’ arrangements.  The survey and interview 
questions were designed to elicit whether information sharing took place in the absence of an LTA 
and if so, at what levels (i.e. did information sharing occur at the same rate as occurred with an 
LTA?).  Although the information sharing and collaboration questions helped the research team 
identify companies that might be concerned about intellectual property, the majority of respondents 
did not indicate intellectual property or highly innovative collaborations were a major concern. 
105 Part of the interest in framing the survey in this manner arose when a General Counsel I 
interviewed suggested that his company tried to avoid signing LTAs.  See Interview (August 8, 
2018) (anonymous) (Date) (on file with author). 
106 North American Industry Classification System, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU 33–40 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (referencing NAICS codes 31 through 33 and their 
subsector codes).  
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manufacturers, the research team found email addresses for 667 manufacturers/suppliers and 
deemed them “likely active” manufacturers.107  An email survey was sent to the 667 “likely 
active” manufacturers. Sixty-nine manufacturers returned an additional eleven survey responses.  
Thus, the overall survey response rate was 3.7 percent for all companies in the original database, 
4.7 percent for “potentially active” manufacturers, and 10.3 percent for “likely active” 
manufacturers. 
In addition to the survey, the research team conducted several one-on-one interviews with 
manufacturers to gather more qualitative data on LTA usage.  The in-person interviews were 
especially helpful in understanding how highly innovative companies use (or do not use) LTAs 
within the context of protecting intellectual property.  Table 1 outlines the annual sales revenue of 
each of the five manufacturers interviewed. 
Table 1: Annual Sales Revenue of Interviewed Manufacturers 
Company 2017 Annual Sales Revenue in USD 
1 $6.3 Billion 
2 $12.03 Billion 
3 $3.2 Billion 
4 $287 Million 
5 $20.4 Billion 
 
VI. Survey Results 
a. LTA Usage 
Our survey of Ohio manufactures indicated that the majority of respondents use LTAs 
infrequently.  Only seventeen percent of respondents (eleven of sixty-three manufacturers) 
 
107 A selection of companies without email addresses were contacted by phone but the majority were 
out of business. 
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indicated that they used LTAs or MSAs in seventy-six percent or more of their transactions (see 
Table 2).  Twenty-four percent of all manufacturers indicated that transactions with LTAs or 
MSAs accounted for seventy-six percent or more of their revenues (see Table 3).  This tends to 
indicate that firms use MSAs and LTAs for high-revenue transactions disproportionately. 
Table 2: Count of Manufacturers by LTA Usage as a Percentage of Transactions 






Table 3: Count of Manufacturers by LTA Usage as a Percentage of Revenues 






In addition, sixty-five percent of respondents indicated that they predominately produced 
customizable goods and twenty-nine percent of respondents indicated that they spent a significant 
amount of money on capital goods for a specific buyer in most of their transactions.  However, 
when looking only at the subsection of manufacturers that indicated that they used LTAs in most 
of their transactions,108 seventy-three percent of manufacturers indicated that they predominately 
produced customizable goods and sixty percent of respondents indicated that they spent a 
significant amount of money on capital goods for a specific buyer. 
LTA usage also varied significantly across industries.  Thirty-two percent of automotive 
manufacturers and fifty percent of aerospace manufacturers used an LTA most of the time.  No 
 
108 This subset consists of the eleven manufacturers that indicated that they use LTAs in seventy-six 
percent or more of their transactions. 
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other industry indicated that they used LTAs in most of their transactions (see Tables 4 and 5).  








Table 5: Counts of Survey Respondents by Industry and LTA Usage 
Industry 0% - 10% 
LTA Usage 
11% - 25% 
LTA Usage 
25% - 75% 
LTA Usage 
76% - 100% 
LTA Usage 
Auto 6 2 5 6 
Aerospace 0 1 4 5 
Other 15 10 11 0 
All Companies 21 13 18 11 
 
b. Customizable vs. Fungible Good 
Generally, companies noted that LTAs could be used as a shield against loss from 
investments in capital equipment.  The most important reasons to use LTAs or MSAs in the event 
of a later lawsuit were:  (1) to protect capital equipment costs or tooling costs; (2) indemnity for 
intellectual property infringement; and (3) as a damages cap.109  Recouping capital equipment 
costs is particularly important when the relationship between the supplier and buyer has 
terminated because the continuing purchase commitment would have ended prematurely.  
 
109 See Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1638, n.75. 
Industry 0% - 10% 
LTA Usage 
11% - 25% 
LTA Usage 
25% - 75% 
LTA Usage 
76% - 100% 
LTA Usage 
Auto 32% 11% 26% 32% 
Aerospace 0% 10% 40% 50% 
Other 42% 28% 31% 0% 
All Companies 33% 21% 29% 17% 
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However, the top answer that manufacturers gave for entering LTAs, without the concern of a 
future lawsuit, was “security of continuing commitment from the buyer.”110  Continuing 
commitment from the buyer would be particularly important where there were large sunk costs 
that could only be recouped by multiple purchases from the buyer over time.  When the 
manufacturer is asked about what matters most, both in the context of a possible lawsuit and in 
an open-ended context, the protection of sunk costs or protection of a continuing purchase 
obligation features prominently.111  In both cases there seem to be large investments that require 
contractual protection. 
The second most selected reason for agreeing to an LTA was the absence of any choice 
by the manufacturer due to the superior leverage of the buyer.  Usually LTAs are used by the 
largest companies that purchase goods in large volumes.  Large and complex companies often 
have increased internal coordination costs and will use management techniques to increase 
internal efficiencies.112 Many of these management techniques have analogous managerial 
provisions that can be found in LTAs dictating the intra-firm behavior between suppliers and 
buyers.113 Over seventy-eight percent of respondents said that the most common characteristic 
between industries that insist on LTAs or MSAs is a large buyer or an OEM.114  The size of the 
buyer may also indicate that more revenue is generated from sales to such buyers and those 
higher revenues may justify the LTAs’ higher cost.  Large sunk cost investments by suppliers are 
also likely to be present with large OEMs as buyers. Thus, fifty percent of manufacturers 
 
110 See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra p. 96 (showing the aggregated survey responses to Q9). 
111 The protection of sunk costs in manufacturing including capital equipment and investments in 
lean production or other specialized processes is analogous to the need to protect intellectual 
property for “incentivizing creative activity.”  See Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of 
Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 284 (2016) [hereinafter Jennejohn, Private Order]. 
112 See Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting:  A Preliminary Study 3  (supra note 
17). 
113 Id. 
114 See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra pp. (need page). 
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frequently using LTAs said that the most important reason for signing an LTA was because it 
was dictated by the buyer. 
 
c. Diversity of Arrangements 
 As shown in Table 6, manufacturers that never, or seldom use LTAs, indicated they 
did not use LTAs primarily because they were already doing business under other documents.  
Terms and conditions and purchase orders were the most likely documents to govern the transaction 
if an LTA was not used.  Although suppliers might reap the benefits from using an LTA as a shield 
to protect capital expenditures and to secure a continuing commitment, suppliers have less incentive 
to enter into LTAs if they are protected under other agreements.  The greater cost associated with 
negotiating an LTA, including the onerous provisions imposed by buyers, the less companies may 
be able to justify using such a contractual arrangement.  However, the company may be justified in 
using an LTA if it incurs large capital costs that can only be recouped through a specific provision 
in the LTA or through a continuing commitment to purchase. 
Table 6: Primary Reasons for Not Using an LTA 
Primary Reason Percentage of 
Manufacturers Seldom 
Using LTAs115 
Percentage of All 
Manufacturers 
Already doing business under 
other documents such as terms and 
conditions or purchase order 
39% 29% 
Terms too onerous 36% 45% 
 
115 See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra p. (need page) (finding that this group of respondents indicated 
that they use LTAs in 25 percent or less of their transactions). 
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Price reduction requirements too 
onerous 
12% 12% 
Do not want to allow buyer a right 
to terminate for convenience 
6% 5% 
Other 6% 8% 




Another important reason why manufacturers did not use LTAs was because LTA terms 
were considered too onerous.  In many instances, the buyer unilaterally dictates the terms of the 
LTA to the manufacturer.  Sixty percent of manufacturers said that they draft less than ten percent 
of the LTA when used and only twelve percent of manufacturers drafted the vast majority of their 
LTAs.  Companies that more frequently used LTAs said that their primary reason not to sign an 
LTA was due to terms being too onerous, followed by not wanting to sign a competition out 
clause, and that they were already doing business under other documents.  If a supplier operates in 
an industry where LTAs are the norm and are often dictated by the buyer, they might only refuse 
to engage in the LTAs if the buyer has a bad reputation for reneging on LTA terms or the buyer 
negotiated the terms to unilaterally benefit themselves.116  One of the respondents indicated that if 
they have a strong competitive position against the buyer they would not want to lock in prices 
with an LTA.  Another manufacturer that often signed LTAs indicated that the company would be 
hesitant to sign an LTA if the buyer was known to constantly change or cancel LTA terms to 
benefit themselves. 
 
116 See generally Advantages of Long Term Contracts, UPCOUNSEL (last visited Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://www.upcounsel.com/advantages-of-long-term-contracts (explaining the advantages and 
disadvantages of LTAs in different industries). 
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d. Information Sharing:  How Does it Occur? 
The survey revealed that generally suppliers are willing to share information within the 
context of an LTA; sixty-seven percent of respondents said they would share information about 
costs or quality if they signed an LTA.  In addition, survey results indicated that manufacturers 
might be willing to share information outside of an LTA.  If there is no LTA signed, companies 
are split on whether they would share information with their buyers, especially related to costs;  
fifty-six percent say they would share information.  Seventy percent of respondents said that they 
were not required to attend any meetings because of the LTA, but seventy-four percent of 
manufacturers not required to attend meetings indicated that they would attend meetings with the 
buyer anyway. 
Manufacturers indicated they would be more likely to share information if the 
government requires cost breakdown or they are working with an aerospace or large firm.  For 
companies that frequently use LTAs, seventy-three percent of respondents noted that they would 
share information even if they did not sign an LTA, making them the most likely group to share 
information with buyers.  Manufacturers that frequently used LTAs reported that they shared 
information because they were required to do so by the buyer117 and because it was an industry 
certification requirement.118  Sixty percent of respondents said that they need to prequalify as a 
supplier to sell their products even without an LTA most of the time.  Purchase orders, terms and 
conditions, and LTAs can all require an ongoing quality assessment by the buyer.  Seventy-one 
percent of respondents indicated that their products had to comply with a buyer’s quality or 
excellence manual under a purchase order or terms and conditions most of the time.  An ongoing 
 
117 Suppliers indicated they would share information even without an LTA due to asymmetric 
bargaining power between themselves and the buyer. 
118 See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra p. (need page). Q23. 
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quality assessment is common under the buyers’ terms and conditions.119 
“Hedging”120 is another type of response to the LTA.  Instead of actually opting out of an 
LTA, suppliers sign them and then hedge to protect against buyer opportunism—another way 
suppliers have of minimizing costs. The hedging by suppliers is part of a pattern of holding back 
information to hedge and self-protect.121 Respondents noted they would not share information in 
cases where the buyer does not request it or there are no industry standards that make information 
sharing mandatory.  Individual respondents from the survey noted that if they sold proprietary 
products, they would be more hesitant to share information with their buyers.  Suppliers are 
worried about sharing information about anything that would allow the buyer to undercut the 
supplier and buy from someone else, including costs.122   
e. Collaboration 
Figure 2 displays the frequency of LTA usage by the frequency of collaboration.  Few 
companies indicated that most of their products were co-designed in collaboration with the 
buyer.  Of the respondents that collaborated, eighty-seven percent said that the collaboration with 
the buyer was at least moderately successful.  However, the model of collaboration seemed to 
vary widely across respondents.  Thirty-four percent of respondents said that buyers supplied 
them with blueprints less than ten percent of the time, but another thirty-seven percent of 
 
119 See Ford Motor Company Global Terms & Conditions for Non-Production Goods and Services 
¶15(a) (“Seller . . . will discuss with Buyer . . . any potential design, quality or manufacturing 
problems with Supplies Seller worked on or produced pursuant to a Purchase Order”); id. at ¶ 
20(a)(ii) (clause permitting buyer to “view any facility or process relating to the Supplies or the 
Purchase Order, including those relating to production quality”); Apple Inc. Purchase Agreement 
Purchase Order Terms and Conditions ¶ 6 (permitting Apple to inspect, and test goods before 
acceptance); Eaton Terms & Conditions:  Selling Policy 2 (permitting buyer to “ witness testing” 
testing”at seller’s factory for an additional fee). 
120 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 99. 
121 See id at 103–04. 
122 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 104. 
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respondents said that buyers supplied them with blueprints over seventy-five percent of the time.  




f. Enforceability of LTAs 
 
The presence of the quantity term ensures that the agreement is enforceable.  Accordingly, 
a quantity term may be the best way to ensure that the continuing obligation to purchase is 
enforceable, thereby helping to defray the sunk costs.  However, only forty-five percent of 
respondents said that most of the time when they signed an LTA it would include a quantity term 
(minimum or exact quantity).  Many manufactures noted they were unsure if an LTA without a 
quantity term would be enforceable and twenty percent responded that they believed an LTA 
without a quantity term would not be enforceable.  Forty-four percent of manufacturers believed 
that an LTA without a quantity clause would become enforceable at signing, while twenty-nine 
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percent of manufacturers believed it would become enforceable when a purchase order was 
signed. 
For manufacturers that use LTAs the most frequently, only thirty-six percent included a 
quantity term in most of their agreements.  For the companies that used an LTA most of the time, 
forty-five percent believed the LTA would become enforceable when the first purchase order was 
signed. Twenty-seven percent believed it was enforceable at the time of signing the LTA.  The 
discrepancy in responses between frequent LTA users and infrequent or non-LTA users might be 
due to a lack of awareness about the functioning of LTAs among firms that rarely use them.   
Termination Clauses also impact a supplier’s ability to protect sunk costs in LTAs.  Figure 
3 shows the percentage of agreements with termination for convenience clauses.  Thirty-eight 
percent of suppliers said that a buyer can terminate for convenience very rarely, while another 
thirty-two percent said a buyer can terminate for convenience most of the time. 
 
 
Many companies said that they would allow a buyer to terminate an agreement, even 
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without a termination for convenience clause, if their tooling and investment costs had been 
repaid.  Allowing termination for convenience or for decreased demand seems to shift that risk of 
fluctuations in demand to the supplier.123  This explanation suggests that parties will make 
adjustments that are not required, but only if there is reciprocal protection The supplier adjusts 
and allows for early termination, but only if the supplier is protected through repayment of the 
tooling and investment cost.  These adjustments can be made outside the contract.  As always, the 
parties weigh the benefits and costs of such adjustments.  The supplier may be willing to accept 
that allocation because the supplier is better able to “redeploy[]  manufacturing assets to another 
purpose” more easily than a buyer.124 
Although firms might elect the protections of an LTA, they are highly unlikely to use 
legal remediesif a dispute arises. .  The vast majority of manufacturers , ninety-two percent, said 
they would almost never resort to suing over a dispute of an LTA.  This finding supports the 
hypothesis that firms must derive some implicit benefit outside of legal protections for engaging 
in an LTA. 
 
VII. Analysis of Results 
In general, our survey results revealed that the majority of Ohio manufacturers used LTAs 
infrequently.  However, LTA usage varied significantly across industries.  The high percentage of 
usage of LTAs by automotive and aerospace manufacturers may be explained by the leverage 
 
123 See GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS NOT RELEVANT HERE. see Matt Viator, Termination 
for Convenience |Can Your Customer Terminate You Without Good Reason?, LEVELSET (last 
updated May 7, 2019), https://www.levelset.com/blog/termination-for-convenience/ (“When the 
customer realizes they’re going to run out of cash, it might be safer (and cheaper) to terminate the 
agreement before it’s too late.”). 
124 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 586. 
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those buyers yield over suppliers,125 or the high collaboration costs associated with the industries.  
The presence of those sunk costs makes it important to control opportunism by the buyer in some 
manner since easy an exit is not possible as it is for fungible goods.  This explanation is consistent 
with anecdotal feedback from a parts supplier who indicated that his company rarely used LTAs 
because as a catalog supplier, his products could be easily sold to others.126 
The fact that the majority of manufacturers that used LTAs in most of their transactions 
had customizable goods is an important finding.  If a product is customized for a particular buyer, 
and is not fungible, the supplier may have invested sunk costs toward customization.  That 
investment makes a resale to others and an easy exit difficult and costly.  Where such 
vulnerabilities exist, the need for protection may justify the costs of LTAs.  In particular, the 
supplier can negotiate contractual protections for sunk costs or a continuing commitment to 
purchase.  This negotiation can help defray the sunk cost investment or some other implicit 
protection such as helping a supplier to enter a new line of business when the market for the 
buyer’s minivan collapsed. 
While the most frequently selected reason that manufacturers gave for entering into LTAs 
without the concern of a future lawsuit was the security of a continuing commitment from the 
buyer, the second most selected reason was the absence of any choice due to the superior leverage 
of the buyer.  This second factor may also be related to the presence of sunk costs.  The larger 
buyers, such as OEMs in the automotive industry or airplane manufacturers, have the leverage to 
dictate their terms. Further, these relationships also likely require large sunk cost investments from 
their suppliers.  Sunk costs that occur in the context of a buyer-supplier relationship are also likely 
 
125 See Ben-Shahar &White, supra note 13, at 954 (discussing “economic power” of original 
equipment manufacturers). 
126 Informational interview with firm with over $10 billion sales (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file with 
author). 
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to have the potential for opportunism because sunk costs are endemic and will occur when 
bounded rationality prevents a contractual control mechanism.127  The sunk costs lead to a 
fundamental transformation of the supplier relationship making exit costly or impossible.  In the 
context of their relationship, controlling opportunism will be important, but difficult, because of 
all of the myriad ways in which a buyer or supplier may act opportunistically, but which cannot 
be anticipated.  Because the contract will not be able to control the problem, there may be other 
governance strategies.  
There are many possible solutions to opportunism when large sunk costs are present.  One 
structural solution is vertical integration.128  Buyers could control external suppliers who could 
holdup buyers once the parties were locked in a bilateral dependent relationship through vertical 
integration. 129  However, vertical integration has become less efficient as the specialized research 
and development (“R&D”) required for innovation is so costly that it makes sense to outsource it 
externally in other firms.  Thus, the decision to outsource is driven by weighing the costs and 
benefits of vertically integrating, which includes the costs of R&D, the benefits of profit capture, 
and the possible holdup costs from outsourcing.  As outsourcing increased, the cost of holdup has 
become less of a problem than once anticipated.130  Because suppliers do not want to jeopardize 
 
127 See ELLEN M. PINT & LAURA H. BALDWIN, STRATEGIC SOURCING:  THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
FROM ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 10 (Rand Corp., 1997) (“Contracts can protect 
transaction-specific investments to some extent, but bounded rationality prevents contracts from 
specifying all possible contingencies. As contracts become more flexible, they allow more potential 
for opportunism.”).  
128 See generally WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 73, at 39. (providing helpful 
background information on vertical integration and a detailed analysis of the strategy). 
129 See Marie-Laure Allain et al., Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up, 83 REV. OF ECON. 
STUD. 1, 1 (2016) (acknowledging that previous scholarship in the field has identified “vertical 
integration as a solution to hold-up problems” but ultimately disagreeing with aforementioned 
scholars regarding their characterization of vertical integration as a solution to the hold-up 
problem). 
130Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 13, at 975 (explaining that hold-up power of supplier is limited 
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future business with buyers, since that would be “suicide,”131 they are reluctant to extort through 
hold-up. 
However, the need to minimize frictions such as opportunism and facilitate coordination 
and control entropy remain current problems for both buyers and suppliers.  The LTA, with its 
offer of implicit protections, security, and cementing relationships,132 offers an incentive for the 
supplier to invest in the relationship.  The LTA operates as a protective safeguard that mitigates 
opportunistic behavior by buyers.  This safeguard encourages sunk cost investments by suppliers 
and helps to minimize the cost of uncontrolled opportunism.  The value of that safeguard may 
diminish if the supplier suspects that the buyer will renege on its implicit commitments or on 
contractual commitments or opportunistically claim that the goods are defective.  The LTAs 
furnish other cost-minimizing features such as low-cost self-help when the product is defective or 
prices “competition-out” clauses to protect the buyers against the “China price”.133 
The fact that only approximately one-third of frequent LTA users in our survey insisted on 
a quantity term that would make the agreement legally enforceable indicates that the value of the 
LTA for suppliers may lie in other non-contractual protections offered by the LTA. This includes 
implicit contracts that prompt buyers to protect suppliers even when not legally obligated to do 
so.134  The absence of a quantity term might also indicate that the supplier is relying on other 
 
due to fear that hold-up will result in a loss of future business). 
 
131 Id. See also Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 438.  Ben-Shahar and 
White support the point in the text AS DOES Gilson. These are much better sources for 
support than the one added in 128 from Investopedia.  
132 Interview with supplier (Aug. 24, 2017) (on file with author). 
133 Bernstein, supra note 12, at 567. 
134 See Esser, supra note 11, at 594 (noting that parties with a pattern of  collaboration rely on 
various implicit mechanisms to fill in contractual gaps). 
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constraints, such as switching costs, that will make it difficult to terminate the relationship.135  
Finally, even if there is no quantity requirement, and the supplier has large sunk costs, capital 
equipment, or tooling, once the first purchase order is issued, the agreement becomes enforceable.  
Additionally, there may be a specific provision on reimbursement for, or ownership of, equipment 
costs that is enforceable once the purchase order is issued.  In these instances, the fact that the 
LTA may not contain an enforceable continuing purchase obligation may not be important 
because that would matter only if the cost of the capital equipment could not be otherwise 
recovered. 
VIII. LTA Usage Within a Bargaining Lens of Economic Behavior 
In order to understand the significance of the survey results, they must be situated within 
the context of a bargaining lens and a model of economic behavior including bounded rationality, 
sunk costs, and multi-faceted opportunism.  The choice of a contractual form may best be 
understood in terms of how the arrangement responds to durable contractual hazards that each of 
the partiesface.136  If contractual hazards remain uncontrolled either by contract or some 
governance mechanism, there will be price adjustments to reflect the uncontrolled hazard.137  Each 
firm will sacrifice some of its interests to accommodate the other party, but only if their bargain 
minimizes costs and advances other interests.  
a. Cost Minimization and Opportunism 
 
135 This protection is important when sunk costs are present.  SWITCHING COSTS ARE NOT 
SUNK COSTS.  
136 See Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Mitigating Contractual Hazards:  Unilateral Options 
and Contract Length, 19 RAND J. ECON. 327, 328 (1988) (suggesting that “the importance of 
[considering] the contractual hazards [when] . . . determining . . . the design of the contract has 
become increasingly apparent”).   
137 See WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS , supra note 15, at 62 (explaining that “technology (k), 
contractual governance/safeguards (s) and price (p) are fully interactive and are determined 
simultaneously”). 
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The buyer faces uncertainty about the quality of the product from the supplier,138 and 
about the competence and ability of the supplier.  The supplier faces uncertainty about potential 
opportunism.139  Opportunism could occur if the supplier invests large sunk costs and the buyer 
terminates early.  Suppliers also face the prospect of buyers appropriating intellectual or other 
property.140  The parties’ agreements must also serve a planning and centralization of terms 
function.141  Each party faces the bargaining process with its own private goals and will reach an 
agreement only if the benefits of achieving those goals through a particular type or form of 
agreement outweigh the costs.  Firms seek a combination of strategies, both contractual and 
informal, that will minimize its costs while maximizing its benefits.  One party may enter a 
formal contract largely for the implicit contracts that form in the wake of the formal contract.142  
Another party may enter the formal agreement because of particular benefits an LTA offers, such 
as shifting the risk of decreased demand to the other party through a termination for convenience 
clause.143  The strategies are not static as they may change in response to behavior by the other 
party that hinders goal achievement and they are contextual and respond to the different factors, 
 
138 This uncertainty is heightened in the case of collaborating on an innovative product, such as a 
new drug or medical device, since the parties cannot draft a complete contract that identifies the 
product. 
139 Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1647–49 (discussing the problems buyers and sellers alike face 
regarding opportunism); Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 438–39. 
140 Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1702–03 (observing the inadequacy of “low-powered sanction[s]” 
where a “party plans to end the relationship by appropriating intellectual property of the other 
party”); see also Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks?, 
8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018). 
141 Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1673 (noting that ease of planning and centralization of decision 
making are benefits of LTAs); see also Esser, supra note 11, at 594. ) 
142 Esser, supra note 11, at 594. 
143 See WE ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS; ALL PRIVATE 
PARTIES. Matt Viator, Termination for Convenience | Can Your Customer Terminate You Without 
Good Reason?, LEVELSET https://www.levelset.com/blog/termination-for-convenience/ (last 
updated Mar. 13, 2020), (“When the customer realizes they’re going to run out of cash, it might be 
safer (and cheaper) to terminate the agreement before it’s too late.”). 
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such as asset specificity or large capital equipment costs. 
In some ways, each party, while seeking to minimize its own costs to advance its projects 
and maximize value, realizes that it must help the counterparty minimize the costs of their project.  
The key is reciprocity.144  There is an implicit agreement that one party will minimize its costs 
and the counterparty’s costs, but only up to a point.  When the costs of the accommodation to the 
other party are large, or the other party acts in an opportunistic manner, or there is a lack of trust, 
one party may take actions to protect itself and in doing so absorb less of the counterparty’s cost 
minimization needs.  As one party attempts to cost minimize at the expense of the other, there 
will be less accommodation, or a party may self-protect, or hedge and share less information.145  
At a certain point, cost minimization may actually result in litigation.  When the demands of the 
counterparty are too great, litigation may be the only way to minimize costs. 
a. Non-Contractual Cost Minimization Alternatives 
It is important to understand that there may be non-contractual cost-minimizing solutions 
that lie outside the LTA or informal enforcement.  For example, parties in the supply chain could 
use non-contractual mechanisms, such as insurance or a corporate structuring,146 that give buyers 
more control over their suppliers.  To answer the question of why buyers would enter into LTAs, 
one must begin with a bargaining model in which each party weighs the cost of drafting against 
the risk of not drafting further and operating purchase-order-by-purchase-order.  What are the 
various ways that buyers could achieve their goals in ways that would be least costly?  What are 
the goals that they could accomplish using terms and conditions, a quality manual, and 
requirements of pre-certification or other means to assure the quality of supplier’s products and 
 
144
 KEN BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 10 (2005) (discussing “rational reciprocity”). 
145 WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 100. 
146 Interview with M&A lawyer (April 4, 2017) (on file with author); ESSER DOES NOT 
SUPPORT TEXTUAL PROPOSITION.  
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processes?  Many of these provisions, such as supplier scorecards,147 International Organization 
for Standardization (“ISO”) Certification,148 and compliance with the buyer’s quality manual149 
can all be imposed hierarchically in a top down manner150 through a purchase order or terms and 
 
147 Supplier Handbook, NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 13, 
http://www.ni.com/content/dam/web/pdfs/20181002_FINAL_32652_Supplier_handbook_2018_Ltr
_WR.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (stating that “Select Suppliers” are those that usually “appear 
on the National Instruments top 80 percent of National [annual] spend”); Supplier Handbook, 
CUMMINS INC. 27, AU BLR PLEASE Add quote marks where indicated in prior sentence. 
QUOTES.https://public.cummins.com/sites/CSP/SiteCollectionDocuments/StandardsandProcesses/S
upplierQuality/Cummins%20Inc.-
Supplier%20Handbook%20(Customer%20Specific%20Requirements).pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2020) (stating that Cummins “use[s] the Supplier Balanced Scorecard to evaluate customer 
satisfaction with selected external production and service suppliers”).ADD END QUOTATION 
mark where noted.  
148 Companies will often require that their suppliers obtain or be ISO certified (and that this 
certification was done by an accredited certification body). One example of an international 
accreditation body is the International Accreditation Forum and an example of a domestic 
accreditation body is NSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board. WHY WAS THIS LANGUAGE AT 
THE START OF THE FN. DELETED  Supplier Quality Manual – Program Requirements, JOHN 
DEERE 6, https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/jdsn/e68e89f6-cb3a-4306-8a0a-
5beeabe61fab/english.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (“[S]uppliers in the John 
Deere supply chain should become compliant to the ISO/TS 16949.”); Global Supplier Quality 
Manual, KOHLER 8, 
http://resources.kohler.com/corporate/kohler/pdf/supplier/GlobalSupplierQualityManual_English.
pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2020), (“Kohler prefers suppliers of production materials with proof of 
certification to ISO 9001 or ISO/TS 16949 by an accredited registrar.”). 
149 See  7June 1,  “Prior to being awarded business from Kohler all new suppliers must read the Kohler Global 
Supplier Quality Manual and then confirm agreement that they will comply with its content and requirements through 
a method agreed with their Kohler purchasing contact.” Supplier Quality Manual – Program Requirements, 
supra note 145, at page (stating that compliance with the JD Supplier Quality Manual is a 
precondition for all John Deere suppliers); Supplier Quality Manual, NCR CORPORATION 4, 
https://www.ncr.com/content/dam/ncrcom/content-type/documents/ncr-supplier-quality-manual.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (“These Quality requirements apply to all Suppliers providing products, 
parts, modules, assemblies or components . . . to NCR plants or NCR contract manufacturers or, 
on NCR’s behalf, directly to NCR’s customers (each, an “NCR Designated Purchaser”); 
Integrated Supplier Quality, NAVISTAR PAGE 8, 
http://www.navistarsupplier.com/IntegratedSupplierQuality/QualityDocuments.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2020) (stating that all current and potential suppliers are expected to comply with the 
provided Quality Manual);Supplier Code of Conduct, CATERPILLAR 1,  
http://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/Caterpillar/C10756688 (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (“We expect 
suppliers to comply with the sound business practices we embrace.”); Bernstein, supra note 12, at 
572. 
150 But see Bernstein, supra note 12, at 563 (suggesting that the network governance is an alternative 
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conditions through an online portal without an LTA. 
For example, buyers can dictate that suppliers must supply products that comply with their 
quality manual in their purchase orders or terms and conditions.151  Even without the consent of 
the supplier in an LTA, the buyer can stipulate that to even be considered as a supplier companies 
must comply with the buyer’s quality manual.  Buyers might also require suppliers to warrant that 
their products comply with any buyer excellence or quality manual in their purchase orders or 
terms and conditions.  The scorecards, ISO Certification, and the quality manual give the buyer 
low-cost ways of minimizing misunderstandings about quality and setting standards and help the 
buyer guard against shading by suppliers.152  They also give suppliers a low-cost way of bonding 
(furnishing a credible commitment of quality).  Where there is a dispute about quality, the parties 
can often work out the issue informally, especially if the buyer has established quality metrics in 
its quality manual. In addition, LTAs may include managerial provisions that define dispute 
resolution procedures which can be cost saving for both parties.153  The desire for continued and  
future business will constrain all parties, especially when the parties are connected to a 
network.154 Shirking could result in negative reputational effects that would hinder the ability of 
the buyer and supplier to obtain future contracts. 
b. LTAs as a Cost Minimization Strategy 
 
to the top-down hierarchy and achieves “many of the governance  benefits of intra-firm 
hierarchy.”).PLEASE ADJUST PLACEMENT OF QUOTATION MARKS. 
151 See John Deere Terms and Conditions, JD SUPPLY NETWORK PAGE 2 
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/jdsn/aa788ea4-de87-4e9a-803e-
08baee3ca5b9/purchasing_terms_and_conditions_us_eng.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mOVIms
B (last visited  April 17, 2020).  
152 See Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 8 (defining 
shading as “behavior that more accurately describes the vexing problems courts face in rooting out 
strategic behavior in contract litigation”). 
153 See Bernstein and Peterson, supra note 17, 5-6. 
154 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 599. 
47 | Page 
 
 
Other goals may be harder to achieve in a unilateral hierarchical fashion, and thus require 
the contractual consent of the other party in an LTA.  This would be particularly true in a long-
term supply arrangement where, for example, the buyer wants the supplier to agree to reduce its 
prices five percent every year or agree to competition-out clauses. 155  The standard purchase 
order or terms and conditions on the online portal govern all supply transactions.  Annual cost 
reductions would only be needed for ongoing transactions where the buyer is subject to 
competitive price pressures that necessitate a guaranteed price reduction from its suppliers.156  
The buyer weighs the risk of entering into a long-term contract to buy with a guarantee of a fixed 
price, against the risk that the future supplier prices will be too high if there are competitive 
pressures on the buyer to reduce its prices. 
A buyer may also enter into an LTA because without such an agreement, a large buyer 
such as an OEM would be reluctant to finance the huge investment of producing a new model car 
without commitments from suppliers.157  Corporate management would be reluctant to assume 
such risks without assurances of price stability and commitments to furnish supplies.  The LTA 
thus functions to protect the sunk cost investments made by the buyer.  For example, one 
interviewee for a large OEM indicated that they would not proceed without an LTA.158 
The LTA may also be important for buyers because it can “signal continuity 
intentions.”159  In certain collaborative LTAs, the structuring of investments constitute examples 
and cement relationships of “reciprocity.”160  That may affect the price because price and 
 
155 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 86. 
156 Id. 
157 Interview anonymous (Jan. 25, 2019) (on file with author). 
158 Id. 
159 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 73, at 34. 
160 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 594. 
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governance are linked.161  The buyer would have to pay a higher price if there were no implicit 
continuity protection and the buyer might have a difficult time getting the supplier to invest sunk 
costs, such as the construction of a plant.162 
The supplier makes the same calculus, weighing whether the additional costs of entering 
an LTA are justified and considering how its overall costs and risks can be minimized.  The 
survey results suggest that the subset of suppliers making primarily customizable goods or 
involving large sunk costs enter LTAs more frequently than the subset making primarily fungible 
goods or involving only minimal sunk costs.163  The supplier has to consider whether the extra 
drafting and negotiating costs and other risks of an LTA, such as the onerous provisions of 
annual price reductions and other pro-buyer terms,164 are outweighed by the greater security or 
commitment of a continuing purchase obligation — even if that purchase commitment is qualified 
or conditional or even terminable — that can be used to defray a large capital investment.  That 
greater security can be achieved either by entering into an LTA [which] deters early termination 
by raising switching costs or providing other implicit protections,165 or by negotiating specific 
contractual protections.166  The expectation of implicit contractual protections from a buyer167 
may affect the supplier’s calculus of whether the LTA is cost minimizing and value maximizing.  
 
161 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 73, at 33–34. 
162 Interview with Susan Helper, Professor of Law, Case Western University (Feb. 21, 2017) (on file 
with author).  
163 See Kostritsky Ice Survey infra pp. 88–104.  
164 For example, many large buyers reserve the right to terminate for convenience.  See Ben-Shahar 
&White, supra note 13, at 958; Ford Motor Company Global Terms and Conditions, supra notex , at 
19 ¶ 27.01 (“buyer may terminate the purchase order in whole or in part, at any time, for any reason, 
upon written notice to the supplier.”,; Apple Purchase Order Terms and Conditions, supra note 116, 
at ¶ 14 (allowing Apple to terminate for any reason with ten days written notice).   
165 See Interview with Susan Helper, Professor of Law, Case Western University (Feb. 21, 2017) (on 
file with author). 
166 These might include protection for capital equipment costs or coverage for expenditures incurred 
up until the date of termination. 
167 See infra Section VIII.e.  
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The entry into the LTA together with the provision of a unique part that is integrated into the 
OEM’s production, gives “suppliers…some power in the course of carrying out a long-term 
contract”168 and explains the willingness to enter LTAs.  As suppliers make large investments to 
meet the demands of the LTA, the buyer becomes locked into the supplier since other suppliers 
could not make the investments required in order to meet the buyer’s needs.169 
The importance of sunk costs demonstrated in the survey data helps to situate the 
scholarship on LTAs in a different framework — one that emphasizes asset specificity rather than 
uncertainty and innovation.  The sunk costs that one or both parties must invest pose risks of 
opportunism.  The bilateral LTA is one means of governance that acts as a contractual safeguard. 
Innovation scholars have deftly explored the ways that information transfer mechanisms in an 
LTA can deter opportunism.170  Our survey explains why these LTA provisions are important to 
suppliers with large sunk costs and why these safeguards are important and cost effective. 
Since there is always a “braiding” of formal mechanisms (even with minimal contract 
documents such as purchase orders) and informal adjustment that leads to a buildup of trust and 
deters opportunism by raising switching costs as parties get to know each other, the question is 
why enter into an LTA when there are large sunk costs?  The answer may be that there are 
implicit or explicit protections for the continuity of the relationship needed when sunk costs exist 
with an LTA that cannot be achieved by purchase orders, thereby providing a benefit to suppliers 
that justifies the higher costs.  These protections include not only switching costs but other 
implicit protections against early termination or explicit protection for sunk costs if there is early 
termination. 
 
168 Ben-Shahar &White, supra note 13, at 973. WHERE DID THE PAG 39 COME FROM? . 
169 See id.  
170 See Jennejohn, Collaboration, supra note 6, at 85; see also Helper et al., supra note 6, at 444. 
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This paper offers an explanation for why the costs of LTAs are justified, through an explanation 
tied to sunk costs, and a comparative cost analysis.171  Even where there is great uncertainty 
about the opportunism of the counterparty or the quality of the products, if the parties did not have 
to invest large asset-specific costs, the need for a contractual mechanism might not be cost-
justified since the parties could simply exit.  As Williamson explains, “an increase in parametric 
uncertainty is a matter of little consequence for transactions that are non-specific.”172 
c. Information Sharing as a Cost Minimization Strategy 
Recent scholarship has identified the information sharing protocols as a key feature of the 
modern LTA (or MSA) for both innovative manufacturing and biopharmaceutical industries.173  
One question is how and why the informational protocols would be a cost minimizing strategy.  
Structured information-sharing allows parties to enter into an agreement when uncertainty about 
the innovation process and final product makes it impossible to enter into a completely contingent 
contract.  It gives the parties a cost-effective way to build up trust. By each party extending 
oneself to one’s partner, a kind of overture and response, trust grows.174  Such provisions make 
parties contractually committed to “invest in producing information,” even if they cannot agree on 
the ultimate product.175  The exchange of this “highly revealing information” in the LTAs 
provides a basis for iterative investments by both parties that constrains opportunism. Information 
sharing may also occur if requested by a party to the agreement, since without it, the unanimity 
needed to go forward on the next stage of the innovative process may not be forthcoming. 
 
171 These take the form of capital equipment costs. 
172 WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 15, at 59. 
173 James A. Breen, Jr., Message From the Chair:  ISPE & Information Sharing, PHARMACEUTICAL 
ENGINEERING (Apr. 2019), https://ispe.org/pharmaceutical-engineering/march-april-2019/message-
from-chair-information-sharing. 
174 Of course, such iterative exchange of information can occur outside an LTA. 
175 Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36, at 476. 
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This incremental exchange of information has several important benefits.  It decreases 
uncertainty about the counterparty’s competence and increases trust in the counterparty’s 
capacity.  The iterative exchange of information reduces uncertainty and therefore risk about the 
benefits of continuing a joint project.  These observations and the knowledge of the counterparty 
raise switching costs for both parties.  In addition, there would be negative reputational effects for 
leaving the relationship because it would be difficult to explain to a new party why the agreement 
failed.176 
This research team has two questions that arise from this iterative sharing of information 
through an LTA:  (1) in a manufacturing setting, how can information sharing occur outside of an 
LTA? and (2) if parties share information without an LTA in ways that will be described below, 
then when would the additional costs and burdens of an LTA be justified?  Answering that second 
question may offer additional insights into how parties structure their transactions to minimize 
risk, control opportunism, and provide for security for investment.  The “braiding” that has been 
rationalized as a way for buyers to learn more about suppliers, to provide new bases on which to 
informally sanction suppliers, and for providing agreement on what constitutes a breach may have 
another important function for the supplier.  The investment in information raises “switching” 
costs,177 thereby providing security for suppliers investing sunk costs.  That protection may be 
further supported by implicit contracts to protect suppliers by providing them major new business 
when circumstances cause an early termination after a supplier has invested. 
One goal of the survey was to ascertain whether information-sharing took place in the 
 
176 Id. at 435 (defining switching costs as “the costs one party to a contract must incur in order to 
replace the other party to the contract”); see id. at 482 (discussing how switching costs present a 
significant barrier where “learning about the quality of potential substitute suppliers and their 
products is time consuming and expensive”). 
177 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 9,  at 1383 n.10. 
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absence of an LTA.  Our survey revealed that over half of all manufacturers indicated they would 
still share information without an LTA, and this was true of nearly three-quarters of those 
manufacturers who frequently used LTAs.  This raises a further question: why would parties 
undertake the additional costs of an LTA if much of the required information could be obtained 
without one?  The surveys prompted a further research outside the survey context into how various 
types of information may be obtained both through an LTA and through other means. 
In the joint innovation context where one party is investing knowledge and another party is 
investing dollars, each party wants to know that the other is fully committed to the endeavor. 
Without that assurance there would be little reason to keep investing toward a joint innovation.  
The failure to comply with informational exchange would rarely be legally sanctioned except in 
blatant cheating or expropriation of another’s property.178  The iterative exchange builds up trust, 
creating it when it was not preexisting.179 
In the manufacturing context involving large buyers, it appears that there are a lot of 
mechanisms for securing information for a buyer from suppliers that do not depend on the 
existence of an LTA.  Buyers can secure a large amount of information without ever entering into 
an LTA.  Many of these mechanisms are designed to reduce uncertainty about the supplier. 
One means of reducing that uncertainty is to require suppliers to prequalify.  That can be 
done outside of an LTA.  Also, instead of using an LTA, the parties can utilize a supplier quality 
handbook or manual to share large amounts of information at a reduced cost.  There are a number 
of options the parties can use to share and assent to the quality manual processes, including 
customer specific processes and general arrangements that apply to all suppliers.  One option is 
 
178 See Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1659–60 (observing that transparency can help deter cheating 
where parties are collaborating on new products); see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
supra note 73, at 57. 
179 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 9, at 1377. 
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requiring all potential suppliers to acknowledge and certify that they are agreeing to the buyer’s 
requirements, such as the quality manual, code of conduct, and terms and conditions, as a 
precondition for conducting business with the buyer.180  In addition to utilizing a precertification 
process, the buyer may simply communicate that the quality documents are a requirement of 
potential and continuing business with the buyer and apply to all suppliers.181 
Quality handbooks or manuals may contain provisions requiring suppliers to gain and 
maintain ISO certification, establish minimum quality requirements, and require compliance with 
all relevant laws, orders, acts, and regulations.182  Additionally, the quality handbooks and 
manuals can require buyers agree to on-site assessments and audits, and supplier quality 
assessment or certification.183  While the quality manual places a number of requirements on the 
 
180 See Conducting Business, KOHLER, https://www.kohlercompany.com/suppliers/conducting-
business Paragraph 1.06  (last visitedJune 1, , 2020) (“Prior to being awarded business from Kohler all new 
suppliers must read the Kohler Global Supplier Quality Manual and confirm agreement they will comply with its 
content and requirements.”)); Prospective Suppliers, KOHLER, 
www.kohler.com/corporate/supplier/prospective-suppliers.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (stating 
that those interested in becoming a Kohler supplier must register). 










visited Apr. 17, 2020) (indicating that compliance with the JD Supplier Quality Manual is a 
precondition for all John Deere suppliers, which is communicated to all potential suppliers as a 
required criterion in John Deere’s prospective supplier’s website). 
182 Supplier Quality Manual— Program Requirements, JOHN DEERE, supra note 146, at 2, 6; Global 
Supplier Quality Manual, KOHLER, supra note 146, at 6–7; Integrated Supplier Quality, NAVISTAR, 
supra note 147, at page; NCR Supplier Quality Manual, NCR CORPORATION, supra note 147, at 4, 
6. 
183 See NCR Supplier Quality Manual, NCR CORPORATION, supra note 147, at 4–5, 13–14 
(describing quality control requirements).  
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supplier it also provides support and guidance for each supplier.184 
In addition to the quality handbooks, buyers may unilaterally impose further conditions on 
suppliers such as requiring suppliers to complete online webinars,185 courses, or “Supplier 
Development Colleges”186 the buyer has developed for suppliers.  The buyer may also develop 
online resources and courses to support the supplier but not specifically require completion as a 
requirement of conducting business.187  Further, the buyer may also require that the supplier 
participate in supplier performance management reviews, continuous improvement processes, and 
participation in supplier excellence programs.188 
The buyers’ purchase order and/or terms and conditions can thus provide protection for the 
buyer and result in the transfer large amounts of information to the buyer without an LTA.  Buyers 
may also include in their purchase order or terms and conditions provisions that cover special 
tooling costs, buyer supplied equipment, inspections, and indemnification.189  The buyer’s standard 
 
184 Supplier Quality Manual— Program Requirements, JOHN DEERE, supra note 146, at 2; 
Integrated Supplier Quality, NAVISTAR,  supra note 147 at page (providing all suppliers with online 
modules, expected to be completed and understood by suppliers, which detail the requirements of 
suppliers); Supplier Quality Manual, NCR CORPORATION,  supra note 147, at 4. 
185 Supplier Connect, Supplier Development College, CATERPILLAR, 
https://supplierconnect.cat.com/wps/portal/catconnect/SDC (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) 
(encouraging suppliers to learn from the Supplier Development program); see also Bernstein, supra 
note x, at 579.  
186 Id. 
187 Supplier Quality Manual— Program Requirements, JOHN DEERE, supra note 146, at 7 (stating 
that John Deere does not require participation or completion but has created a number of online 
resources including classes, manuals, and presentations to assist suppliers). 
188 Id. at 39 (requiring suppliers to participate in the Achieving Excellence program); JD Supply 
Network, JOHN DEERE, 
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/portal/jdsn/Home/Welcome/!ut/p/z0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAf
Ijo8zifd1dXN2NTQz9LJy8TA0c3Qy9_Dz8TcPMnA31vfSj8CsAmpCZVVgY5agflZyfV5JaUaIfkZ
VSnBdfnppUnFmSqmoA4qkaJBYU5GQmg-0tBonFJxflF-gXZEdFAgDM2k5_/ (last visited Apr. 
17, 2020) (requiring suppliers to participate in the JD Crop program); Supplier Connect, Supplier 
Development College, CATERPILLAR, supra note 182 (offering an excellence program with much 
less information available on it than John Deere’s). 
189 Terms & Conditions for the Purchase of Goods And/Or Services, JOHN DEERE PAGE, 
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purchase order may contain additional provisions governing disputes and governing law, product 
liability and insurance, and termination for cause or convenience.190  In the case either party 
terminates, the purchase order can contain clauses covering the termination process including 
inventory indemnification, special tooling, or capital expenditures.  A manufacturing company’s 
purchase order may cover excess and defective goods, acceptance, modification, and payment.191  
Thus, rather than enter into an LTA that requires compliance with the buyer’s quality manual or 
handbook, the buyer’s purchase order or terms and conditions192 can contain such provisions 
requiring compliance with both the supplier’s code of conduct and quality manuals or handbooks. 
The mere availability of information about a supplier’s qualifications  may not build trust 
in the same way that happens when procedures are implemented that cause the supplier and buyer 
to be linked, such as when the buyer sends an engineer to the supplier’s plant.  That linkage helps 
to provide protection through increased switching costs that deter either party from switching.  
The LTA, or an informal arrangement, may also set up specific procedures that require 
benchmarking error and detection that help a buyer/assembler.193  An LTA may also provide 
implicit security that if the buyer has to terminate early, it will find a way to compensate the 
investing supplier.  When that implicit assurance is degraded because of perceptions of 




B (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (listing a provision stating that buyers are not responsible for any 
excess goods, an indemnification clause, and a requirement that the seller bear the cost of special 
tooling). 
190 Id. 
191 Id.; Supplier Quality Manual, NCR CORPORATION, supra note 147, at 9, 18. 
192 See Terms & Conditions for the Purchase of Goods And/Or Services, JOHN DEERE, supra note 
186, at page.  
193 Helper et. al., supra note 6, at 451 (noting that procedures implemented “without reliance on 
vertical integration or elaborate contracts.”)  
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Even though the survey did not collect empirical data on reasons why buyers enter LTAs, 
the increased information from LTA’s may give buyers the means to identify new forms of 
misbehavior194 and to provide the architecture for demonstrating “how . . . to do business”195 and 
to furnish “contract administration mechanisms” which facilitate governance between firms much 
as the hierarchy functioned in the firm.196 This increased information has a similar advantage of 
avoiding the need for legal enforcement since the mechanisms do not relate to breach, but to 
“create a framework for growing relational social capital.”197  Since there are other ways to grow 
social relational capital between firms (incrementally, over time) that do not depend on an LTA, 
the question is why and when buyers would enter such agreements and under what circumstances 
and for what reasons. The larger and more complex the firm, the greater the internal coordination 
costs.198 Management techniques like leaning manufacturing or key performance indicators  (KPI) 
can help reduce waste and costs in large and complex firms.199 Since they are engaging in cost 
reduction strategies internally, large buyers may have greater incentive to require suppliers to 
adhere to the same management techniques.200 Presumably buyers such as OEMs make the same 
calculus as suppliers do, choosing to enter an LTA when that particular arrangement minimizes 
their costs while controlling contractual hazards and thereby maximizing value. 
Although some types of information about suppliers might be obtained in hierarchical 
means imposed outside an LTA, such as posting the quality manual on the web and mandating 
adherence to it or mandating compliance with ISO or other certification standards, or by posting a 
 
194 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 604 (discussing the “broaden[ing] [of] the type of misbehavior 
than can be policed.”) 
195 Id. at 562. 
196 Id. at 563. 
197 Id. 
198 Bernstein and Peterson, supra note 17, 32-37. 
199 Id. at 10-14. 
200 Id. at 27. 
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portal for suppliers to learn about the quality requirements,201 there are other benefits which cannot 
be obtained without an LTA, including a right to terminate suppliers.  The investment in 
establishing elaborate private governance mechanisms in a setting where buyer assemblers have 
large fixed costs may be justified by the business planning benefits and control over the suppliers’ 
production processes and resulting trust and increased bond that facilitates “increasingly complex 
and innovative value-creating undertakings.”202  Where the investments by t h e  buyer were not 
significant, the need to devise such mechanisms through agreements with suppliers would not 
exist, at least raising the possibility that sunk costs may explain why buyers are investing in 
elaborate LTAs.  The LTAs may ensure a commitment to price reductions from suppliers. 
The LTA may offer a roadmap or scaffolding for consultation during the course of a 
complex process.  In each case the buyer would weigh what benefits an LTA can offer and 
whether those benefits can be achieved without an LTA.  Most importantly, LTAs offer buyers 
the needed security of a guaranteed price and a commitment to supply.203 Without this security 
large a n d  c o m p l e x  organizations such as OEMs could not plan or operate.  The sunk costs of 
planning a car, for example, means that the buyer cannot simply exit and redeploy its assets.  It 
will not be able to recoup its investment unless it produces the cars profitably, which cannot occur 
unless the supplier commits to supply the parts for the life of the production of the car at a fixed 
price.  Those goals cannot be achieved without an LTA.  A further survey could confirm whether 
the presence of the buyer’s large sunk costs help explain why the buyers enter into an LTA by 
assuring the buyer a continuing commitment but often not obligating the buyer to buy at all.  It 
 
201 Id. at 578. 
202 Id. at 589. 
203 See WHITFORD, supra note 2, at 84-86 (noting that although the buyer may gain security through 
guaranteed price reductions and a supply commitment, perhaps at a guaranteed price, the supplier 
often does not gain parallel security). 
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gives the buyer an option in effect. 
d. Self-Help Remedies 
For the buyer, the additional costs of an LTA can be spread out over a myriad of 
transactions with suppliers.  Also, many provisions in the LTA help to minimize costs for the 
buyer.  Many LTA provisions give the buyer the ability to engage in self-help remedies that 
eliminate the need to resort to a legal solution for goods that do not comply with the buyer’s 
quality specifications.204  Instead of employing the buyer remedies in the Uniform Commercial 
Code (“U.C.C.”), the contract provides that the supplier can remove the unwanted part from the 
contract, relieving the buyer from any further obligation to buy.205  Other provisions give the 
buyer the ability to get reimbursed for correction of parts that do not conform, again without 
having to seek any remedy through the courts.  Often, the buyer in an LTA is given the right to 
refuse goods that do not meet the buyer’s standards.  The ability to operate outside of the legal 
system minimizes costs to the buyer and explains how the LTA can facilitate self-help and 
reduce buyer costs. 
While there are many provisions that the buyer can impose on the supplier unilaterally 
and informally, other provisions, such as cost reduction provisions, may require the consent of 
the supplier.206  Of course, self-help accommodation may be possible if worked out individually 
between a supplier and a buyer when goods fail to conform.  The LTA’s higher cost may be 
offset by a minimization of transaction costs. Instead of having to agree (extracontractually) to a 
 
204 See Bernstein, supra note 12, at 576–78, 589 (explaining that information exchanges encourage 
cooperation between parties by helping avoid misunderstandings about what performance is 
expected). 
205 See Matthew C. Brown et al., Termination for Convenience Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, ABA COM. L. NEWSL., Mar. 10, 2014, at 3, 4 (explaining that termination for convenience 
clauses are “becoming increasingly popular in supply agreements.”).   
206 See supra note 77 on cost reductions in LTAs.  
59 | Page 
 
 
self-help arrangement where the supplier agrees to discount the invoice for goods the buyer 
complains about, the buyer is given wide discretion to be relieved of any obligation to buy goods 
which do not meet the buyer’s metrics or standards.207  That mechanism relieves the buyer of 
having to negotiate each accommodation seriatim. 
The self-help provisions of the LTA may also be cost minimizing for the supplier because 
the supplier’s willingness to sign an LTA with self-help provisions acts as a low-cost signal to 
the buyer — a kind of credible commitment — that the supplier will not furnish substandard 
goods or will readily comply with the self-help provisions of the contract.  The supplier who 
signs such agreements may be eligible for more favorable prices than if the supplier insisted on 
compliance with the full regimen of the U.C.C. 
e. Sunk Costs and Cost Reduction Strategies 
Another function of the LTA is related to the sunk costs involved in collaborative 
agreements.  The buyer in these supply contracts may require the supplier to undertake expensive 
procedures such as root-cause analysis,208 or other large investments such as implementing a lean 
production methodology at the plant,209 or building an entire plant to manufacture a single 
component, such as a car door.  The entry into the LTA may help to induce the supplier  to provide 
the foundation that will cement the relationship and offer the supplier implicit protections even 
though they are not formally in the contract.210  That insight led one interviewee to respond that a 
large automotive supplier would not have undertaken the investment toward lean production 
without the protection of an implicit contract and security if they made the investment.  That 
security could come in continuing purchase obligations either in the contract at issue or through 
 
207 See Whirlpool 2002 Strategic Alliance Agreement with Whitesell Corporation Section 6.3. 
208 See Sabel, Real-Time Revolution, supra note 2, at 122. 
209 Id. at 118. 
210 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 36, at 988. 
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help from the supplier in securing a different contract.211  Other provisions in an LTA impose on 
the supplier the need to engage in a cost reduction program that will redound to the benefit of the 
buyer.  Cost reduction programs (often called the annual five percent letter) could not be imposed 
unilaterally on a supplier without the supplier’s express agreement. 
In other instances, the LTA functions as a planning device.  Parties refer to it to determine 
which party should be investing how much and issuing what reports.  That planning function must 
occur in the context of an individually negotiated LTA so the standard terms and conditions or 
quality manual available on the web will not provide the needed blueprint for collaboration, 
thereby justifying costs of the individual agreement. 
One remaining question is how the LTA, with its higher drafting and lawyering costs, 
could be a cost minimizing device for suppliers.  Our survey revealed that manufacturers that 
used LTAs in most of their transactions tended to produce customizable goods and spend a 
significant amount on capital expenditures.  This is an important finding, because if a product is 
customized for a particular buyer, and the supplier invested sunk costs toward customization, that 
investment makes an easy exit from the relationship or resale to others difficult and costly.  
Where such vulnerabilities exist, the need for protection may justify the costs of LTAs. The costs 
are especially justified if the supplier can negotiate contractual protection for sunk costs or a 
continuing commitment to purchase which can help defray the sunk cost investment.212  LTAs 
may protect against sunk costs in a variety of ways, such as by providing for the protection of 
large capital equipment and providing that if the relationship terminates, the capital equipment 
 
211 See Interview with Susan Helper, Professor of Law, Case Western University (Feb. 21, 2017) (on 
file with author).  
212 See Whitesell Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 1:05–CV–679, 2009 WL 3270265, at *8 (W.D. 
Mich. Oct. 9, 2009) (stating that the defendant had a continuing obligation to “purchase all of 
Whitesell’s pre-approved inventory.”). 
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belongs to the supplier. 
There are two primary differences that explain why and when suppliers use LTAs.  They 
are likely to occur when the goods are:  (1) customizable non-fungible; and (2) there are large sunk 
capital equipment costs involved in the manufacture.  These two factors make it difficult for the 
supplier to exit and resell the goods.  The greater sunk costs and accompanying vulnerabilities 
may justify the greater costs of an LTA, at least if the LTA offers greater protection to the party 
asymmetrically investing sunk costs, either through contractual protection for capital equipment 
or by implicit contracting or by switching costs, all of which function to protect suppliers. 
Another way to protect sunk cost investments that can occur in an LTA is through the 
parties investing mutual sunk costs resulting in a mutual dependency.  Mutual investment could 
occur when the buyer invests in training suppliers and suppliers invest in training to become 
excellent suppliers.213  This can occur in an LTA in which one party invests sunk costs in research 
and the other invests research dollars.  When those sunk costs are not present, as for example 
when the supplier sells catalog items,214 the supplier may operate using less costly arrangements, 
such as a purchase order or terms and conditions.  The supplier has less need for contractual 
protections because the supplier can simply exit and resell. 
This outcome linking the greater use by suppliers of LTAs to greater sunk costs is 
consistent with the parties achieving their goals while minimizing transaction costs.  The supplier 
who invests large sunk costs (either capital equipment or investments in procedures such as lean 
production or in building an entire new plant) faces the prospect of opportunistic behavior by a 
buyer who terminates early.  The supplier may enter into an LTA which may offer some security 
 
213 Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 37, at 476 (stating that the “mutual 
investment” serves as a safeguard against opportunism). BLR: Add quotation marks here. 
214 Kostritsky, supra note 16, at 1673 (stating how LTAs can control terms for suppliers across the 
board) costs/. 
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to purchase goods over a period of time.  The protection for the supplier that comes from entering 
an LTA can come through specific contractual protections for sunk costs or capital equipment in 
the LTA.  It can also come through informal protections or implicit contracts that come once the 
supplier has invested sunk costs.  Simply entering into the LTA may help to cement the 
relationship.215  The demonstration of competence may also deter the buyer’s exit from the 
relationship as finding other competent suppliers will take time.216 
Thus, where the sunk costs are large and the goods are not fungible, the ability to recoup 
or to protect such investment will depend on a variety of strategies, some informal and some 
contractual.  If the sunk costs are low, the LTA may not be needed.  Although the LTA may offer 
protection for the supplier, either through implicit protections, the buyer may find enough other 
benefits in the LTA to offer the cost of an LTA and make it cost minimizing for the buyer.  
Transaction cost minimization may help to explain other differences, as discussed below. 
f. Informal and Implicit Contracts 
Even without a contractual provision protecting its sunk costs, a supplier may be relying 
on the iterative exchange of information and personnel to build up a relationship of trust.  Such a 
relationship will serve to curb opportunistic behavior by the buyer.  The information exchange 
leads to an incremental reduction of uncertainty about buyer opportunism.  Moreover, as both 
parties learn more and become more comfortable as partners, switching out becomes less 
feasible.  Entering a LTA and engaging in the exchange of information resulting in “braiding” 
 
215 Informational interview (June 17, 2017) (on file with author).ALL INTERVIEWS 
ANONYMOUS EXCEPT HELPER. 
216 It is not actually necessary to enter an LTA to demonstrate competence since a supplier investing 
and producing could demonstrate that competence over time, leading to a lock-in effect.  The 
question is what protection the LTA offers suppliers in terms of a security of commitment (legal or 
implicit) or in terms of protection for sunk costs, as for example a provision that obligates the buyer 
to pay for parts and sunk costs when the buyer decides to terminate. 
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becomes a private strategy to bind the parties together and also results in protecting the suppliers’ 
sunk costs.  Implicit contracts then arise to protect the supplier.  For example, when the Lear 
Company developed seats for a Honda minivan and that minivan was never made, each party 
accommodated the other.  Lear agreed that the downturn in demand was an outside event that 
excused Honda from buying the seats. Honda, despite there being no enforceable obligation 
helped Lear enter the side mirror and other markets.  These implicit contracts that arise from 
long-term partnerships help to explain why suppliers with large sunk costs are willing to enter 
into LTAs; the implicit contract protections serve as a private strategy of protection.  The 
supplier may believe and rest on an implicit contract that the buyer will protect suppliers who 
invest large sunk costs, even without being obligated to do so.  Another example of this occurred 
with Honda Motor Company and Donnelly.217 
Cost minimization as a tool for understanding supply chain arrangements can be 
understood in this way.  Where there are large sunk costs being demanded of suppliers, the LTA 
may offer a cost-effective safeguard against opportunism.  Some of these protections are implicit 
contracts to protect suppliers who invest for buyers.  Other safeguards arise from the switching 
costs from iterative investments.  Where sunk costs are low, the supplier can easily exit t o  
protect itself and the costs of an LTA may not be justified. 
The cost minimization explanation linking LTAs to large sunk costs by suppliers, may 
also explain another governance mechanism in the LTAs:  the use of a veto. Professor Jennejohn 
explains the veto right contained in many LTAs involving intellectual property as a way of 
providing a “right to exclude”.218  The party wants a veto power to exclude the counterparty from 
appropriating his foreground intellectual property.  The veto is a governance mechanism.  The 
 
217Interview with Susan Helper, Professor of Law, Case Western University, February 21, 2017. . 
218 Jennejohn, Private Order, supra note 111, at 324. 
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question is why it would be a cost minimizing way to deal with the threat of appropriation of 
intellectual property.  The answer is that without the veto, there is the threat that the property may 
be shared and the boundaries improperly delineated.  Once that occurs, it may be difficult to 
unwind and separate out the intellectual property.  The type of governance mechanisms featured 
in the work of the innovation scholars that bind parties together and prevents an early exit or 
opportunism in the form of shading of quality may not work with protecting “foreground IP”.219  
Once the property is shared, “U.S. patent law allows a joint owner to license and otherwise 
exploit jointly a jointly owned asset,” and the most cost-effective mechanism is to prevent the 
appropriation from occurring in the first place.220  Informal sanctioning would not work because 
there would be nothing to sanction once the intellectual property had been appropriated.  Thus, 
the parties may agree to an LTA that contains a veto right since the problem of protecting 
foreground IP cannot be solved through informal sanctioning.  In this situation, an LTA with a 
veto provision may be needed.  The LTA veto provision responds to a risk that cannot be 
controlled with the informal sanctioning. Thus, the extra conduct provision is cost minimizing. 
Another example of an LTA as a cost minimization strategy can be found with Apple and 
SCI.  On their face, the extensive collaboration provisions reflected in the Apple and SCI 
Agreement may seem burdensome and costly.221  However, the costs of those undertakings by 
the supplier in a collaborative undertaking will be considered, along with the risk of multiple 
suppliers, and weighed against the greater switching costs if the supplier can demonstrate that it 
 
219 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 9, at 1410–11 (stating how parties use different governing 
mechanisms to lock each other into an agreement) and Jennejohn, Private Order, supra note 111, at 
308. 
220 Id. 
221 See generally Sample Business Contracts Fountain Manufacturing Agreement – Apple Computer 
Inc. and SCI Systems, ONECLE (May 31, 1996), 
https://contracts.onecle.com/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml. 
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is a worthier, more collaborative supplier than other Apple suppliers.  Then, Apple will bear the 
greater investment in collaborative efforts going forward because it would be loath to lose the 
worthy supplier as a partner.  The supplier would consider the benefits of such loyalty and 
security along with the other benefits of the contract, including the initial three-year purchase 
commitment. 
If the supplier encounters a circumstance that changes its calculus of whether the implicit 
contract will still offer protection without an explicit provision to do so, the supplier may no 
longer view the LTA as a cost minimizing strategy.  Parties and courts constantly trade off these 
costs.  Parties will no longer participate in the informal governance mechanism if the costs are not 
offset by greater benefits in achieving parties’ goals while minimizing costs.  For example, the 
supplier’s willingness to enter into an LTA may depend on whether the supplier believes the 
buyer is trustworthy.  When the supplier believes that the buyer is opportunistic and will renege 
on any obligations in the LTA, the supplier’s calculus changes, because the buyer’s propensity to 
act opportunistically will require additional protections.  Once the buyer decides that it can cancel 
at will, the implicit protections afforded by iterative investment may no longer be effective. 
Doubts about the buyer’s use of supplier information might lead to another cost 
minimizing strategy—hedging.  In circumstances where the supplier has doubts about the buyer, 
the supplier may start to hedge and withhold some private information.  That hedging strategy 
can be seen as a cost minimizing strategy by the supplier to control buyer opportunism when the 
contract itself does not constrain such behavior.  The hedging strategy differs from opting out of 
an LTA. Instead of opting out, a supplier holds back information while technically complying 
with its obligations under an LTA. 
IX. Conclusion 
Manufacturers seem to be making deliberate choices about whether to operate using an 
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LTA or an alternative arrangement, such as a purchase order or terms and conditions.  These 
deliberate choices are often tied to whether a manufacturer is likely to incur significant capital 
expenditures or the potential for large sunk costs as the result of the transaction.  When a supplier 
does not have large sunk costs and is making a fungible good, and can easily exit the relationship 
without sacrificing large investments, the cost minimizing strategy may be to use an alternative to 
the LTA and rely on other arrangements. 
Although the sample size in this study was small, our results provide additional insights 
into supplier (manufacturer) decision making regarding contractual arrangements.  Our survey of 
Ohio manufacturers highlights that manufacturers have to weigh many considerations before 
entering into an LTA.  Weighing these considerations leads to a diversity of contractual 
arrangements among manufacturers, with only a small minority (seventeen percent) using LTAs 
in most of their transactions. 
Our empirical findings are consistent with a model of bargaining under conditions that 
include bounded rationality, sunk costs and opportunism.  In instances where a supplier is 
requested to customize a product for a buyer, and such customization results in significant sunk 
costs for the manufacturer, then the manufacturer rationally may seek to protect itself through an 
LTA.  Without the protection of an LTA, the buyer may exit the relationship easily and the overall 
transaction becomes costly for the supplier.  LTAs can also provide additional frameworks, such 
as information sharing provisions, to help safeguard the supplier’s relationship with the buyer.  
These findings provided from manufacturer surveys serve as a useful compliment to current 
research reviewing existing LTAs and theoretical models exploring the potential use of such 
agreements. 
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Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 
Requesting Participation in Survey Case Western Reserve University 
Dear Manufacturer, 
I am a professor at Case Western Reserve University Law School. My special areas of expertise are Contracts and 
Law and Economics. I am studying the legal relationships between manufacturing companies and their customers in 
the supply chain. In order to complete this study, we are conducting a survey of various suppliers who manufacture 
goods or parts for their customers. Your response to this survey would be invaluable to the study. All responses will 
remain anonymous. You have been selected because you are a manufacturer in Ohio, Wisconsin or Michigan who 
produces products or parts used by customer/buyers who may use your input in a product they manufacture and sell. 
You are either in Sales and Marketing or the General Counsel’s office. If you receive this survey and another person 
at your company is better equipped to answer the survey, please redirect it to them. The purpose of this survey is to 
determine when manufacturing companies and their customers rely on various long-term or master supply 
agreements (LTAs; MSAs) to guide their interactions. Specifically, we are hoping to learn when companies use these 
agreements, what specific purposes the agreements serve, when companies use alternatives to an LTA or MSA (such 
as a purchase order, quote and acknowledgement or another arrangement such as acting as a contract      
manufacturer or entering a licensing agreement on a jointly developed product without using an LTA or MSA). Feel 






















Q2 What percentage of your work for customers is a customizable good? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-35% (2) 
o 36-66% (3) 





Q3 What percentage of your work for customers is a commodity or fungible good? 
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o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-35% (2) 
o 36-66% (3) 





Q4 For what percentage of sales do you acquire capital equipment or tooling that will be used for a specific 
buyer that is significant in cost? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-35% (2) 
o 36-66% (3) 
o 67-100% (4) 
 
 










Q5 If you use LTAs or MSAs, which of the following provisions is the MOST and LEAST important to you in 
terms of a possible lawsuit later on? Please organize the options for 1 MOST important to 6 LEAST 
important. 
  Provision to protect capital equipment costs or tooling costs (1) 
  Indemnity for intellectual property infringement (2) 
  Damages cap (3) 
  Indemnity for damages caused to a third party (4) 
  Warranty disclaimers (5) 




Q6 In what percentage of transactions do you sign an LTA or MSA? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-25% (2) 
o 26-75% (3) 
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Q7 What percentage of firm revenues do transactions with an LTA or MSA represent for your firm? 
o 0-25% (1) 
o 26-50% (2) 
o 51-75% (3) 
o 76-100% (4) 
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Q8 If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage is the agreement drafted by you? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-25% (2) 
o 26-75% (3) 





Q9 What are the main reasons you sign LTAs or MSAs? 
▢Security of continuing commitment from the buyer (1) 
▢No choice; dictated by the buyer (2) 
▢Establish an efficient system for information sharing to improve your product (3) 
▢Demonstrate your commitment to the quality of your product or process (4) 
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Q10 If you sign an LTA or MSA, are you required to share information with the buyer about engineering, 
costs and/or quality? 
o Yes (1) 
o No  (2) 





Q11 If you do NOT sign an LTA or MSA with the sharing of information, do you supply that information to 
your buyer anyway? Please explain your response. 
o Yes, explain: (1)    
o No, explain:  (2)    
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Q12 If you do NOT sign LTAs or MSAs, please rank order the reasons you did not sign an LTA with 1 being 
the MOST important the 6 being the LEAST important. 
  Terms too onerous (1) 
  Do not want to sign a competition out clause (2) 
  Do not want to allow buyer a right to terminate for convenience (3) 
  Price reduction requirements too onerous (4) 
   Already doing business under other documents such as terms and conditions or purchase 
order (5) 















Q14 Do the buyers or industries that insist on LTAs or MSA have any of the following characteristics in 
common? 
o Buyer is large in size or an Original Equipment Manufacturer (1) 
o Buyer is engaged in intensive collaboration with us on innovated product (2) 
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Q15 Select the answer that best applies. Are the buyers who insist on using LTAs or MSAs: 
o In the top 20% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or revenue (1) 
o In the top 50% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or revenue (2) 
o In the bottom 20% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or revenue  (3) 
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Q16 In what percentage of your deals do you agree to manufacture a product without an LTA or MSA in 
place? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-35% (2) 
o 36-75% (3) 





Q17 If you do agree to manufacture a product without an LTA or MSA, what document/s would govern this 
transaction? Pick all that apply. 
▢Intellectual Property and Licensing Agreements (1) 
▢Blueprints only; you act as a contract manufacturer (2) 
▢Terms and Conditions (3) 
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▢Purchase order/quote/acknowledgement (4) 





Q18 If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage of agreements does it contain a minimum quantity, 
percentage volume, or exact quantity term? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-35% (2) 
o 36-66% (3) 
o 67-100% (4) 
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Q19 If the LTA or MSA has no quantity clause or no minimum quantity clause and no percentage volume 
commitment, would you consider the agreement at the time that it is signed to be? 
o Legally enforceable (1) o 
Legally unenforceable (2) o 





Q20 If the LTA or MSA lacks a quantity term, when do you think the LTA or MSA would become 
enforceable? 
o When the first purchase order was signed (1) 
o When the LTA or MSA is signed (2) 








Q21 In what percentage of cases do you agree that the buyer can terminate for convenience as a clause in the 
LTA or MSA? 
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o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-25% (2) 
o 26-75% (3) 





Q22 Suppose your LTA/MSA had NO termination for convenience clause. If your buyer indicated it no 
longer needed your parts and wanted to terminate 2 years into a 3-year contract, would you allow the buyer 
to exit anyway? 
o Yes (1) 
o No  (2) 
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Q23 In what percentage of cases do you need to prequalify as a supplier to sell your products to a buyer even 
if there is no LTA or MSA? 
o 0-25% (1) 
o 26-50% (2) 
o 51-75% (3) 





Q24 In what percentage of sales does the Purchase Order or Terms and Conditions from your buyer or 
Instructions on the Buyer’s website require your product to comply with a buyer quality or excellence 
manual? 
o 0-25% (1) 
o 26-50% (2) 
o 51-75% (3) 
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Q25 If you are required to participate in an ongoing quality assessment program by the buyer, how is it 
required? Please select any that apply. 
▢LTA or MSA (1) 
▢Terms of a purchase order (2) 
▢Terms and conditions of your customer (3) 
▢Other, explain below: (4)    
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Q26 Are you required to attend any, or a certain number of, meetings with the buyer because of an LTA or 
MSA provision? 
o Yes (1) 







Q27 If not required to attend meetings with the buyer as required under the LTA or MSA, do you attend 
meetings anyway? 
o Yes (1) 
o No  (2) 
 
Display This Question: 
If Are you required to attend any, or a certain number of, meetings with the buyer because of an LTA... = No 









Q28 What percentage of your products are co-designed in collaboration with the buyer? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-25% (2) 
o 26-75% (3) 
o 76-100% (4) 
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Q29 If there is significant collaboration with a buyer, in what percentage of cases do you enter an 
LTA or MSA? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-25% (2) 
o 26-75% (3) 





Q30 If you collaborated in design, how successful would you rate the collaboration? 
o Not at all successful (1) o 
Somewhat successful (2) o 
Moderately successful (3) o 








Q31 In what percentage of cases does the buyer supply you with blueprints for the end product (or, together, 
you determine the blueprints for the end product) and your only job is to execute the blueprints? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-25% (2) 
o 26-75% (3) 
o 76-100% (4) 
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Q32 In any arrangement with the buyer under a purchase order, LTA, or MSA, in what 
percentage of cases would you resort to suing the buyer because of a dispute? 
o 0-10% (1) 
o 11-25% (2) 
o 26-75% (3) 
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Aggregated Survey Responses 
Q1 - What are your company’s main products? 
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Q2 - What percentage of your work for customers is a customizable good? 
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Q4 - For what percentage of sales do you acquire capital equipment or tooling 
that will be used for a specific buyer that is significant in cost? 
 
 
For what percentage of sales do you acquire capital equipment or tooling that will be used for 
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Q5 - If you use LTAs or MSAs, which of the following provisions is the MOST 
and LEAST important to you in terms of a possible lawsuit later on? Please 
organize the options for 1 MOST important to 6 LEAST important. 
 
Rankings 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Provision to protect capital equipment 
costs or tooling costs 
30.8% 15.4% 2.6% 7.7% 10.3% 33.3% 39 
Indemni y for intellectual property 
infringement 
23.1% 10.3% 10.3% 20.5% 15.4% 20.5% 39 
Damages cap 17.9% 15.4% 28.2% 20.5% 7.7% 10.3% 39 
Indemnity for damages caused to a third 
party 
17.9% 12.8% 20.5% 23.1% 17.9% 7.7% 39 
Warranty disclaimers 2.6% 35.9% 10.3% 20.5% 25.6% 5.1% 39 
Limitation of remedies provision 7.7% 10.3% 28.2% 7.7% 23.1% 23.1% 39 
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Q6 - In what percentage of transactions do you sign an LTA or MSA? 
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Q7 - What percentage of firm revenues do transactions with an LTA or MSA 
represent for your firm? 
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Q9 - What are the main reasons you sign LTAs or MSAs? 
 
 
What are the main reasons you sign LTAs or MSAs? - Selected Choice Percentage 
Security of continuing commitment from the buyer 34.8% 
No choice; dictated by the buyer 33.3% 
Establish an efficient system for information sharing to improve your product 7.6% 
Demonstrate your commitment to the quality of your product or process 7.6% 
Other, explain below: 16.7% 
Total 66 
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Q10 - If you sign an LTA or MSA, are you required to share information with 
the buyer about engineering, costs and/or quality? 
 
If you sign an LTA or MSA, are you required to share information with the buyer about 
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Q11 - If you do NOT sign an LTA or MSA with the sharing of information, do 




If you do NOT sign an LTA or MSA with the sharing of information, do you supply that 
information to your buyer anyway? Please explain your response. - Selected Choice 
Percentage 
Yes, explain: 45% 






Q12 - If you do NOT sign LTAs or MSAs, please rank order the reasons you 
did not sign an LTA with 1 being the MOST important the 6 being the 
LEAST important. 
 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Terms too onerous 23.8% 38.1% 26.2% 11.9% 0.0% 0.0% 42 
Do not want to sign a competition out 
clause 
2.4% 9.5% 35.7% 23.8% 21.4% 7.1% 42 
Do not want to allow buyer a right to 
terminate for convenience 
4.8% 11.9% 16.7% 40.5% 26.2% 0.0% 42 
Price reduction requir m nts too 
onerous 
14.3% 23.8% 11.9% 16.7% 28.6% 4.8% 42 
Already doing business under other 
documents such as terms and 


























Q14 - Do the buyers or industries that insist on LTAs or MSA have any of the 
following characteristics in common? 
 
 
Do the buyers or industries that insist on LTAs or MSA have any of the following 
characteristics in common? - Selected Choice 
Percentage 
Buyer is large in size or an Original Equipment Manufacturer 83.3% 
Buyer is engaged in intensive collaboration with us on innovated product 4.2% 






Q15 - Select the answer that best applies. Are the buyers who insist on using 
LTAs or MSAs: 
 
 
Select the answer that best applies. Are the buyers who insist on using LTAs or MSAs: Percentage 
In the top 20% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or revenue 51.0% 
In the top 50% of companies you work with in terms of size and/or revenue 34.7% 






Q16 - In what percentage of your deals do you agree to manufacture a 
product without an LTA or MSA in place? 
 
 
In what percentage of your deals do you agree to manufacture a product without an LTA or 











Q17 - If you do agree to manufacture a product without an LTA or MSA, 
what document/s would govern this transaction? Pick all that apply. 
 
 
If you do agree to manufacture a product without an LTA or MSA, what document/s would 
govern this transaction? Pick all that apply. - Selected Choice 
Percentage 
Terms and Conditions 30.0% 
Purchase order/quote/acknowledgement 31.5% 
Other, explain below: 3.8% 
Intellectual Property and Licensing Agreements 16.9% 





Q18 - If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage of agreements does it 
contain a minimum quantity, percentage volume, or exact quantity term? 
 
 
If you sign an LTA or MSA, in what percentage of agreements does it contain a minimum 











Q19 - If the LTA or MSA has no quantity clause or no minimum quantity 
clause and no percentage volume commitment, would you consider the 
agreement at the time that it is signed to be? 
 
 
If the LTA or MSA has no quantity clause or no minimum quantity clause and no percentage 
volume commitment, would you consider the agreement at the time that it is signed to be? 
Percentage 
Legally enforceable 37.8% 
Legally unenforceable 15.6% 






Q20 - If the LTA or MSA lacks a quantity term, when do you think the LTA 
or MSA would become enforceable? 
 
 
If the LTA or MSA lacks a quantity term, when do you think the LTA or MSA would become 
enforceable? - Selected Choice 
Percentage 
When the first purchase order was signed 37.0% 
When the LTA or MSA is signed 43.5% 






Q21 - In what percentage of cases do you agree that the buyer can terminate 
for convenience as a clause in the LTA or MSA? 
 
 
In what percentage of cases do you agree that the buyer can terminate for convenience as a 











Q22 - Suppose your LTA/MSA had NO termination for convenience clause. If 
your buyer indicated it no longer needed your parts and wanted to terminate 
2 years into a 3-year contract, would you allow the buyer to exit anyway? 
 
 
Suppose your LTA/MSA had NO termination for convenience clause. If your buyer indicated 
it no longer needed your parts and wanted to terminate 2 years into a 3-year contract, would 











Q23 - In what percentage of cases do you need to prequalify as a supplier to 
sell your products to a buyer even if there is no LTA or MSA? 
 
 
In what percentage of cases do you need to prequalify as a supplier to sell your products to a 











Q24 - In what percentage of sales does the Purchase Order or Terms and 
Conditions from your buyer or instructions on the buyer’s website require 
your product to comply with a buyer quality or excellence manual? 
 
 
In what percentage of sales does the Purchase Order or Terms and Conditions from your 
buyer or Instructions on the Buyer’s website require your product to comply with a buyer 












Q25 - If you are required to participate in an ongoing quality assessment 
program by the buyer, how is it required? Please select any that apply. 
 
 
If you are required to participate in an ongoing quality assessment program by the buyer, how 
is it required? Please select any that apply. - Selected Choice 
Percentage 
LTA or MSA 18.2% 
Terms of a purchase order 29.5% 
Terms and conditions of your customer 39.8% 





Q26 - Are you required to attend any, or a certain number of, meetings with 
the buyer because of an LTA or MSA provision? 
 
 
Are you required to attend any, or a certain number of, meetings with the buyer because of an 









Q27 - If not required to attend meetings with the buyer as required under the 
LTA or MSA, do you attend meetings anyway? 
 
 
If not required to attend meetings with the buyer as required under the LTA or MSA, do you 























Q29 - If there is significant collaboration with a buyer, in what percentage of 
cases do you enter an LTA or MSA? 
 
 
If there is significant collaboration with a buyer, in what percentage of cases do you enter an 















If you collaborated in design, how successful would you rate the collaboration? Percentage 
Not at all successful 0.0% 
Somewhat successful 8.3% 
Moderately successful 37.5% 






Q31 - In what percentage of cases does the buyer supply you with blueprints 
for the end product (or, together, you determine the blueprints for the end 
product) and your only job is to execute the blueprints? 
 
 
In what percentage of cases does the buyer supply you with blueprints for the end product (or, 













Q32 - In any arrangement with the buyer under a purchase order, LTA, or 
MSA, in what percentage of cases would you resort to suing the buyer because 
of a dispute? 
 
 
In any arrangement with the buyer under a purchase order, LTA, or MSA, in what percentage 
of cases would you resort to suing the buyer because of a dispute? 
Percentage 
0-10% 92.5% 
11-25% 5.7% 
26-75% 1.9% 
76-100% 0.0% 
Total 53 
 
